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I.

INTRODUCTION

After viewing several television commercials promoting a certain
medical treatment and doing some related research on the Internet,
a middle-aged man walks into his physician’s office and requests a
1
prescription for an advertised “lifestyle” medication. He explains
that he is going on a cruise with his girlfriend the following week and
he needs the medication as soon as possible. The doctor reminds the
patient that he has been treating him for high blood pressure and
this drug may cause him some severe problems, possibly even a heart
attack. The patient briefly considers the risks and then demands the
drug anyway.
The physician thinks to himself: “I just graduated from medical
school with $250,000 of debt. Amanda and I just opened this practice, and we can’t afford to alienate patients if we want to stay afloat.
I can’t believe how much we’re paying in rent and salaries, and my
family seems to think it’s time we start living like a ‘doctor’s family.’
As a resident, I wouldn’t have given this guy this drug, but now I can’t
afford to say no. Besides, I’ve fully explained the risks—it’s his call.
And the risks aren’t that high. Plus, maybe his managed care plan
will deem it medically unnecessary or impose a huge co-pay, and
when he sees how much it’s going to cost him, he’ll just drop this
idea.”
∗
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This hypothetical could just as easily have focused on a middle-aged woman
who walks into her physician’s office and requests an “improved appearance” medication.
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What should the doctor do? If a patient specifically requests a
particular treatment, medical device, or diagnostic test, is properly informed of all the associated risks, and is willing to assume those risks,
does a physician nonetheless have a responsibility to refuse a request
that the physician believes is not medically indicated?
Until the middle of the twentieth century, a physician could and
generally would decide unilaterally what was in the “best interest” of a
2
patient and most likely would have refused these types of requests.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, patient advocates challenged this paternalistic approach and insisted that patients, not their doctors, should make treatment decisions. But
should physicians provide requested treatments even when the patient’s request is contrary to the physician’s medical judgment? Furthermore, should doctors be held liable if they fail to exercise independent medical judgment when acceding to a request that poses a
material risk to the patient?
The answer to these questions is relatively unclear. Neither
courts nor scholars have given much attention to this issue. The primary reason for this void is that this situation seldom arose until the
1990s, even after the doctrine of informed consent gained formal recognition. Patients generally did not know enough about medical
care to ask for a specific form of treatment. The proliferation of the
Internet and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) release of a
Draft Guidance in 1997 permitting direct-to-consumer advertising
(“DTCA”), however, have combined to provide patients with a wealth
of information that they may not employ wisely and may be leading to
a dramatic paradigmatic shift in the nature of the physician-patient
relationship. Patients today are far more likely to self-diagnose their
ailments and to push for or insist upon certain medications or other
3
medical products or procedures. Notwithstanding their physicians’
concerns about the wisdom of the patients’ views, these patients can
place considerable pressure on physicians to order this treatment.
2

See infra Part II.
A recent report noted that between seventy-five and eighty percent of Internet
users have looked online for health information and revealed that seventy-five percent of online patients with a chronic condition “say their last health search affected
a decision about how to treat an illness or condition.” SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET
& AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE ENGAGED E-PATIENT POPULATION: PEOPLE TURN TO THE
INTERNET FOR HEALTH INFORMATION WHEN THE STAKES ARE HIGH AND THE CONNECTION
FAST 2 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Health_
Aug08.pdf; see John Schwartz, Logging On for a Second (or Third) Opinion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2008, at F2. Another recent report, however, debated whether patients are
“swimming” in a sea of health information or “drowning” in it. Tara Parker-Pope,
You’re Sick. Now What? Knowledge Is Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at F1.
3
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This pressure may become particularly salient when patients threaten
to go to another doctor if their physicians do not comply with their
demands, or when physicians operating under the “crush” of daily
practice are unwilling or unable to take the time to engage patients
in a discussion as to why the requested medical response is contraindicated.
This Article explores the nature of a physician’s obligation to refuse to provide medically contraindicated treatment to an insistent
patient, even at the risk of alienating and perhaps losing the patient
to another (perhaps less ethical) physician. Part II of this Article details the history of the physician-patient relationship, describing the
impact of a shift from the “paternalistic” model to a “patient autonomy” model. Parts III and IV discuss the widespread availability of
medical information via the Internet and DTCA, respectively, and
their impact on the physician-patient relationship. Part V discusses
physicians’ current responsibility, driven by the doctrine of informed
consent, to involve patients in the decision-making process and to
permit them to make treatment decisions for themselves, and examines whether informed consent adequately protects patients in a
world of DTCA and the Internet.
Part VI argues that physicians have an ethical and a corresponding legal obligation to exercise independent medical judgment when
a patient demands access to products and services that are not medically indicated, and discusses the appropriate legal standard associ4
ated with a failure to meet this obligation. Part VII explores the
benefits for physicians, patients, and society as a whole of recognizing
that physicians have a fiduciary duty to exercise independent medical
judgment in response to a patient’s demand for a service that is not
medically indicated. This Article concludes that it is not enough for a
physician to merely inform patients of the risks of requested medical
services and products, but that a physician also has an affirmative
ethical and legal obligation to exercise independent medical judgment and to refuse to acquiesce to a patient’s request that is contrary
to the doctor’s medical judgment—notwithstanding the patient’s “informed” demand for that service or product.

4

It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the situation where a patient requests a medical service that the physician believes is ethically—as opposed to medically—contraindicated (e.g., a request for an abortion).
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II. HISTORY OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Historically, the doctor-patient relationship has been founded
upon the principle of beneficence, played out through the doctrine
5
of medical paternalism. Medical paternalism eventually gave way to
notions of patient autonomy during the twentieth century when it
was determined that patients have the right to make their own treat6
ment decisions. As discussed below, some commentators are now
arguing that the era of patient autonomy should, in turn, give way to
a shared responsibility where both the physician and patient jointly
exercise decision-making authority.
A. Paternalism
Medical paternalism can be defined as “an action taken by one
7
person in the best interests of another without their consent.” Since
the days of Hippocrates, doctors have been empowered to make deci8
sions for their patients. Jay Katz, in his landmark work on the physician-patient relationship, observed that giving patients the liberty to
make their own treatment decisions “was never part of the ethos of
9
medicine.” Another scholar has written that “[t]he doctor decided
what was best for the patient, and the patient accepted the decision,
usually without questioning, [without] understanding, or perhaps
10
even [without] a real choice.”
Ancient Greeks, including Plato and Hippocrates, taught that
11
patients should not play a part in the decision-making process.
They viewed such participation as unnecessary and counterproductive because the doctor and the patient presumably had the same ob-

5

Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 245, 263 (2000).
6
Id.
7
David C. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of
Physician Conscience for the Physician-Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
243, 244 (1983) (citing James F. Childress, Paternalism and Health Care, in MEDICAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PATERNALISM, INFORMED CONSENT, AND EUTHANASIA 15, 27 (Wade L.
Rovison & Michael S. Pritchard eds., 1979)).
8
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1–2 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 2002) (1984).
9
Id. at 2.
10
Scott, supra note 5, at 263.
11
Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman’s Sceptre and Prison,
9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 157, 187 (1997) (“‘Perform [these duties] calmly and adroitly,
concealing most things from the patient while you are attending to him . . . revealing
nothing of the patient’s future or present condition.’” (quoting 2 HIPPOCRATES,
DECORUM 297 (W. Jones trans., 1967))).
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12

jective: to heal the sick. The physician alone possessed the knowledge and experience needed to make a medical decision, so a patient’s input was viewed as unnecessary. In addition, ancient physicians believed that a patient’s psychological well-being was critical to
the healing process. They thought it would be therapeutically counterproductive for a patient to truly understand their compromised
state of health and the risks that they faced, knowledge which in turn
would jeopardize, limit, and slow recovery.
The Corpus Hippocraticum went so far as to recognize a duty of
deceit, which encouraged physicians to conceal the patient’s true
13
Ancient healers justified
condition—especially from the patient.
manipulation of the patient by noting, as Socrates did, “the healing
14
effects of fair words.” Ancient doctors believed optimism and confidence were essential to the healing process. According to Hippocrates, the therapeutic effect of encouraging words was so important
that a good doctor should always “promise to cure what is curable
15
and to cure what is incurable.” Needless to say, the patient had little
role to play in deciding the course of treatment.
This belief in the therapeutic importance of “fair words,” even
when these “words” did not accurately reflect the patient’s condition,
and the limited involvement of patients in treatment decisions, continued to pervade medical ethics centuries later. In the words of
ninth-century Jewish physician Isaac Israeli: “Reassure the patient and
declare his safety even though you may not be certain of it, for by this
16
you will strengthen his Nature.” The importance of optimism and
the value of deceit continued to justify physicians’ paternalistic
treatment of their patients.
In addition to the therapeutic impact of limited disclosures and
optimism, physicians also insisted that there was an intimate relationship between God and doctors. During the middle ages, Jewish, Arabic, and Christian physicians asserted that God anointed doctors;
therefore, any attempt to question the physician would be question17
ing God, which would be blasphemous. As a result, the paternalistic
12

KATZ, supra note 8, at 6.
Lori B. Andrews, The Right and Rite of Informed Consent, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
765, 766 (1987) (describing one aspect of medical paternalism as “concealing most
things from the patient, while you are attending to him . . . turning his attention
away from what is being done to him; . . . revealing nothing of the patient’s future or
present condition”) (citation omitted).
14
KATZ, supra note 8, at 6.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 9.
17
Id. at 8–9.
13
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model for physician-patient interactions was, if anything, stronger
18
during medieval times than its more recent manifestations.
Paternalism continued to pervade the physician-patient relation19
20
ship throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth cen21
turies. Until the middle of the twentieth century, doctors—and society—viewed physicians as having an obligation to act in their
patients’ best interests, with no duty to inform patients of their treat22
ment options.
A particularly striking judicial recognition of paternalism oc23
curred in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, where the New
Jersey Supreme Court found that a physician was justified in ordering
a blood transfusion even when a patient’s objections were based on a
religious belief that this treatment would result in the eternal damna24
tion of the patient’s soul. The court stated, “When the [interests of
18

Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of
Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1,
15 (1996) (“The essential model of the covenantal physician-patient relationship
based on a patient’s obedience and trust also was adopted by Moslem and Arabicspeaking Jewish physicians who became the intellectual heirs, custodians, and translators of the works of Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen into Hebrew and Arabic.”).
19
KATZ, supra note 8, at 10–13.
20
Id. at 13–16. Note that some scholars started to recognize the need to communicate with the patient, but the physician still made the final decision. See Mendelson, supra note 18, at 19 (“‘Every man has the right to speak where his life or his
health is concerned . . . . It becomes [the patient] to interpose with politeness, and
deference to the judgment of the physician; it becomes [the physician] to hear what they
have to say with attention.’” (quoting J. GREGORY, LECTURES ON THE DUTIES AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF A PHYSICIAN 35 (1992) (1772)) (emphasis added)).
21
KATZ, supra note 8, at 16–25. Mendelson defends physicians of this era by asserting that the decision to forego explanations was an expression of “professional
honesty” because physicians at that time did not understand the “benefits and risks
involved in a particular course of therapy.” Mendelson, supra note 18, at 22–23.
Nevertheless, even Mendelson admits that “modern bioethicists would describe [this]
attitude as ‘paternalistic.’” Id. at 22.
22
See RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 100–01
(1986) (“[B]efore the mid-twentieth century, the beneficence model . . . was the only
operative model of the physician’s responsibility to the patient.”). Others argue,
however, that the seeds of informed consent existed long before the patient autonomy movement of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Martin S. Pernick, The Patient’s Role
in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED., MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: STUDIES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 1, 3 (Gov’t
Printing Office, 1982) (“[T]ruth-telling and consent-seeking have long been part of
an indigenous medical tradition, based on medical theories that taught that knowledge and autonomy had demonstrably beneficial effects on most patients’ health.”).
23
279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971). New Jersey later overruled the case to the extent
that the court placed greater importance on the physician’s rights than the patient’s
rights. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d. 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
24
Heston, 279 A.2d at 673.
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a] hospital and staff are . . . pitted against the belief of the patient, we
think it reasonable to resolve the problem by permitting the hospital
and its staff to pursue their functions according to their professional
25
standards.”
B. Patient Autonomy
26

In 1914, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s con27
sent commits an assault.” To assert that a physician dedicated to
healing the sick could assault a patient in the course of providing
care that was neither negligent nor willfully deficient was nothing
short of remarkable at that time (a view shared by many physicians
now as well) and marked a radical shift toward recognizing patients’
rights in the physician-patient relationship.
The notion that patients should have the legal right to make
their own decisions—and that doctors should obtain consent before
28
Inperforming invasive procedures—originated in contract law.
deed, it has been widely noted that the consent Justice Cardozo
called for in Schloendorff “had its basis in the prominent and ancient
29
legal principle of consent in contract law.”
Analyzing the physician-patient relationship as merely a contrac30
tual arrangement, however, ultimately proved to be inadequate.
Under a traditional contractual approach, the physician merely had
to show that the patient gave his or her general consent for the
treatment provided, even though the patient had not been told about

25

Id. See also Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”:
Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
269, 315 (2006).
26
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
27
Id. at 93.
28
See Bryan J. Warren, Comment, Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A
Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L.
REV. 917, 929 (2000) (“Originally, the sufficiency of information provided and the
nature of the physician-patient relationship were examined under principles of contract law.”); see also Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943); Scott, supra note
5, at 264 (“Since the early part of this century, the law has expressed society’s view
that it was wrong—a violation of autonomy—to treat the patient without some kind
of consent.”).
29
Warren, supra note 28, at 929.
30
See id. (noting that the bargaining asymmetry between physician and patient,
and the doctor’s potential conflicts of interest are reasons for the unsatisfactory nature of the contractual relationship).
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potential treatment alternatives; only a “minimalist expression of
31
General consent may be sufficient for
autonomy” was required.
contractual parties with equal bargaining power who possess similar
insights into and information about a proposed contractual agreement, but the knowledge disparity between a doctor and a patient
32
can result in an enormous asymmetry between the two. Analyzing
the formation and implications of a physician-patient relationship
under a contractual framework proved insufficient because of this
asymmetry, particularly when physicians’ potential conflicts of inter33
34
est began to be recognized. In addition, patients are typically sick,
injured, or worried about their state of health and in no position to
engage in a traditional bargaining process. In other words, the physician and patient are not conducting an arms-length transaction in
35
the traditional sense. Contract law provided insufficient protection
for the under-informed, vulnerable, distracted, or anxious patient.
Just as a rising tide raises all boats, the increased recognition of
civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s permeated and enhanced a range
36
of individual rights, including those of medical patients. Although
at first glance they may seem unrelated, the civil rights movement
dramatically impacted the physician-patient relationship by creating a
social atmosphere in which Americans placed increased value on the
37
rights of individuals, including those of medical patients. Authority
was openly questioned—whether it was the authority exercised by
state and local officials or by a local physician—and the concept of
31

Scott, supra note 5, at 264.
Id.
33
For example, the undisclosed financial interests of a physician who recommends a course of treatment to enhance the income of the physician rather than to
meet the medical needs of the patient can result in an inappropriate conflict of interests. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that a research physician has an obligation to disclose his financial interest
in a course of treatment).
34
Warren, supra note 28, at 929. As will be discussed in Part V, this asymmetry of
information is one of the primary bases for courts finding that physicians have a fiduciary duty to their patients.
35
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The patient’s
reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions.”).
36
Swartz, supra note 25, at 314–17 (“As the result of the growing consumer and
civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis among both medical
ethicists and the courts began to center on a model of medical decision-making that
emphasized patient autonomy and self-determination, rather than physicians’
rights.”).
37
See Scott, supra note 5, at 265; see also FADEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 87 (“The
issues raised by civil rights, women’s rights, the consumer movement, and the rights
of prisoners and of the mentally ill often included health care components.”).
32
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individual autonomy and rights rose to the forefront of social thinking.
In the political and social climate of the 1950s and 1960s, the patient autonomy movement was born. One scholar has gone so far as
to describe the resulting rise in patient autonomy as “‘the greatest
38
During this
revolution of twentieth century American society.’”
time, “Patients began to voice the ethical proposition, founded on
the autonomy principle, that they, rather than the doctors, should
have the ultimate authority to decide the course of their medical
39
In an attempt to secure this newfound “ultimate autreatment.”
40
thority,” patients turned to the American court system.
The courts ultimately endorsed the position espoused by the patients, finding doctors liable if they failed to properly disclose significant risks and obtain “informed consent” before initiating medical
41
treatment. A California court first used the phrase “informed consent” in 1957 in a case where a physician admitted that he failed to
disclose the dangers of a surgical procedure to his patient, and the
42
patient awoke from surgery paralyzed. The doctrine was affirmed
43
and further explicated in the seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence,
where the court ruled that a physician has a duty to disclose to a patient the material risks associated with a proposed procedure that a
reasonable patient would need to hear to make an informed deci44
sion. The informed consent requirement marked the culmination
of the shift in the nature of the physician-patient relationship from a
45
paternalistic approach to one that emphasizes patient autonomy.
Under the patient-autonomy model, patients make the ultimate
decisions concerning their healthcare, although these decisions are
“based on the physician’s description of the relative risks, benefits,
46
and alternatives available.” To determine which procedures are in
their best interest, patients are entitled to know their viable options
38

Swartz, supra note 25, at 314 (quoting Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy,
and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (1999)).
39
Scott, supra note 5, at 265.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 265–66.
42
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957).
43
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44
Id. at 787 (“[A] risk is . . . material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy.”).
45
Id.; see infra Part V.A for further discussion of the informed consent doctrine.
46
Swartz, supra note 25, at 316.
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47

and the material risks and benefits associated with each option. The
doctor is responsible for dispensing information; the patient is responsible for making the decisions.
On its face, alarmists could view this shift as resulting in highly
trained professionals being reduced to mere information conduits
with little decision-making authority, their extensive knowledge and
48
expertise utilized only to the extent desired by the patient. In practice, however, patients usually seek and follow their doctors’ treatment recommendations, and the recognition of patient autonomy
did not revolutionize the physician-patient relationship, nor did it
dramatically change the nature of the interaction between physicians
49
and patients. For example, although advance directives were and
continue to be highly heralded as a means of preserving the decisionmaking rights of patients, they have been found to have had a limited
impact on medical decisions, notwithstanding that the Patient SelfDetermination Act of 1991 mandates that patients must be notified of
their right to execute such a document prior to every hospital admis50
sion.
Nevertheless, the respect afforded patient autonomy in the latter
half of the twentieth century did represent an important landmark:
society and the courts emphasized that patients have the right to make
their own medical decisions, even if they do not necessarily exercise
it. As one scholar has indicated, “Informed consent has become the
legal and philosophical cornerstone of physician-patient relation51
ships.” From a doctrinal perspective, the pendulum of power in the
physician-patient relationship may appear to have swung almost entirely to the side of the patients, even if it is a right of patients that is
52
infrequently exercised and even more rarely enforced.
47

Scott, supra note 5, at 266.
Liana Fraenkel & Sarah McGraw, Participation in Medical Decision Making: The
Patient’s Perspective, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 533, 536 (2007) (reporting on patient
interviews in which patients explain that they make the decision after receiving the
relevant information and recommendations from the physician).
49
Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision Making, Informed Consent
and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54, 56 (2004) (“Although patients
have broad rights to make their own decisions, . . . many patients, for a variety of reasons, choose to delegate decisional authority to their physicians.”).
50
Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 30, 30–31.
51
Jonathan D. Moreno, Arthur L. Caplan & Paul Root Wolpe, Informed Consent, in
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 687 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 2d ed. 1998).
52
Much of the concern about this perceived shift can be attributed to relatively
unjustified assumptions by physicians regarding the impact of this doctrinal change.
One prominent medical malpractice attorney has referred to lawsuits based on a
failure to obtain informed consent as the “hobgoblins” of physicians. Thomas E. Al48
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C. Shared Duty Between Doctor and Patient
Some scholars argue that the pendulum has appropriately swung
back to a more moderate position and that a shared decision-making
53
The terms
model governs today’s physician-patient relationship.
used more recently to describe physician-patient relationships are
54
“negotiation” and “concordance.” Such concepts signify a decision55
making process where both parties are actively involved.
Today, it is widely agreed that proper healthcare decision making involves a detailed communication and exchange between patients and physicians: the patients share their symptoms, concerns,
goals, personal and family history, and lifestyle; and the physicians
share the risks, side effects, alternatives, and probable results of po56
tential treatment options. Neither of the parties can or should shirk
their respective responsibilities.
Indeed, “[i]n its purest form, there is a two way exchange of information, [with] both doctor and patient reveal[ing] treatment
57
preferences, and both agree[ing] on the decision to implement.”
When making decisions, both the physician and the patient have access to important and relevant information, but each also lacks vital
information. On the one hand, physicians understand the medical
implications, consequences, and risks of various treatment options.
Patients, however, know what is important to their lives, what they
hope to accomplish, and which risks they are willing to take.

bro, Former President, Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, Address at University of
Virginia School of Law (Nov. 28, 2007). Nevertheless, a deeply entrenched fear of
being sued for a failure to obtain informed consent has resulted in informed consent
forms becoming ubiquitous, notwithstanding that they are largely ignored by the patients required to complete them as a condition for obtaining medical treatment.
53
Sydney Morss Dy, Instruments for Evaluating Shared Medical Decision Making: A
Structured Literature Review, 64 MED. CARE RESEARCH & REV. 623, 623 (2007) (describing the shared decision-making model).
54
Nicola Mead & Peter Bower, Patient-Centredness: A Conceptual Framework and Review of the Empirical Literature, 51 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1087, 1090 (2000).
55
See Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 329, 356 (1999) (“[M]any health care scholars and practitioners have promoted
a consensus-based or shared decision-making model.”).
56
See, e.g., Ben A. Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient Autonomy: The More
Things Change the More They Remain the Same, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 87, 102–03
(“[W]eighing the risks and benefits of any medical procedure or course of treatment
involves the consideration of a certain amount of scientific information. But it also
involves important normative elements . . . .”).
57
Cathy Charles, Tim Whelan & Amiram Gafni, What Do We Mean by Partnership in
Making Decisions About Treatment?, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 780, 781 (1999).

HAFEMEISTER (FINAL)

346

4/6/2009 10:45:41 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:335

For example, a professional athlete with a particular injury may
desire a type of treatment that is likely to involve considerable initial
pain and discomfort and carries a high risk of long-term disability,
but which will enable the athlete to compete at the highest level and
receive enormous compensation for a few more years. However, an
office worker with the same injury may want to minimize both current and future pain, with little concern that he or she may not be
able to compete at the same level athletically as in the past. Under
the shared decision-making model, physicians explain alternative
treatment options and offer their opinion as to which option is superior, while patients describe their individual circumstances and desires and, in light of the available options, express their view on which
58
option is best. Such a dialogue is believed to enhance the likeli59
hood of a successful and mutually embraced treatment. At the end
of the day, they hopefully can and generally do agree on the proper
course of treatment.
III. THE INTERNET AND ITS IMPACT ON
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS
While preparing for the day’s activities and watching a child don
a pair of pants, a parent notices that the child’s right leg is an inch
shorter than the left leg. What is the parent’s first action? Does the
parent call the child’s pediatrician to set up an appointment? Does
the parent take the child straight to the emergency room? Or does
the parent first perform a quick Internet search to learn more about
this condition? A patient may similarly visit the Internet after prescribed medication has not resolved back pain as quickly as hoped or
after receiving an adverse diagnosis from a physician.
Patients now regularly seek health information on the Internet
and then use this information to treat or otherwise respond to a
58

JENNIFER C. JACKSON, TRUTH, TRUST AND MEDICINE 156 (2001) (“The relationship between doctor and patient is based on the concept of partnership and collaborative effort. Ideally, decisions are made through frank discussion, in which the doctor’s clinical expertise and the patient’s individual needs and preferences are shared
to select the best treatment option.” (quoting ANN SOMMERVILLE, MEDICAL ETHICS
TODAY: ITS PRACTICE AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1993))).
59
See Richard L. Kravitz, Measuring Patients’ Expectations and Requests, 134 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 881, 881 (2001) (“Meeting patients’ expectations produces greater
satisfaction with care, which in turn is related to greater adherence to medical advice, less ‘doctor-shopping,’ and a lower propensity to sue for malpractice.”) (citations omitted). Kravitz also cites four empirical studies to demonstrate that patients’
expectations are complex but can be determined by paying attention to the patients’
“expression of feelings, provision of explanatory models, personal stories, and behaviors suggesting unresolved conflicts.” Id. at 886–87.
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health concern, which may help them to decide whether and when to
ask for the assistance of a physician and may also prepare them for
60
any subsequent visit with a physician. In addition, as out-of-pocket
costs and the number of individuals without adequate healthcare
61
coverage grow, even more individuals are likely to turn to the Internet for medical guidance in the hope of minimizing their healthcare
expenses. One recent study determined that over sixty percent of
62
A
Internet users have searched for medical information online.
2004 Harris Interactive poll found an even higher number of Internet users—seventy-four percent—have searched for medical informa63
tion. The bottom line is that Americans routinely use the Internet
to gain information about their health.

60

Sonia W. Nath, Relief for the E-patient? Legislative and Judicial Remedies to Fill
HIPAA’s Privacy Gaps, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 533 (2006).
61
See Reed Abelson, Health Care Costs Increase Strain, Studies Find, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2008, at C4 (“Two studies released [on September 24, 2008] provide further evidence of the toll health care is increasingly placing on working families, even for
those who have health insurance. And as employees are paying more medical expenses out of their own pockets, they are having a harder time coming up with the
money.”); Lisa Girion, Ranks of Uninsured in U.S. Shrank in ’07: The Census Bureau Says
the 2007 Decrease Is Mostly Due to Expanded Government Coverage for Children, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2008, at A-20 (reporting that the number of Americans without health insurance was 45.7 million in 2007 (15.3% of all Americans)); see also NAT’L COALITION
ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (2009) [hereinafter FACTS
ON HEALTH INSURANCE], available at http://www.nchc.org/documents/Coverage%20
Fact%20Sheet-2009.pdf (“Nearly 46 million Americans, or 18 percent of the population under the age of 65, were without health insurance in 2007 . . . .”); id. at 2–3
(“Employee spending for health insurance coverage . . . has increased 120 percent
between 2000 and 2006.”) (citation omitted); id. at 4 (“A study found that 29 percent
of people who had health insurance were ‘underinsured’ with coverage so meager
they often postponed medical care because of costs.”) (citation omitted); Press Release, The Commonwealth Fund, Higher Costs and Stagnant Incomes Increase Financial Burden of Health Care, at 1 (Jan. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Higher Costs and
Stagnant Incomes], available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/HA_
Financial_Burden_NewsRelease.pdf?section=4059 (“45.4 Million Americans in Families Spending More than 10 Percent of After-Tax Income on Health Care in 2004—
Almost 6 Million More than in 2001.”).
62
Michael B. Eisen & Andy Gass, Public Access to Public Science: Recommendations for
the California Stem Cell Institute’s Policies Regarding Grantee-Produced Journal Articles, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1177, 1182 (2006).
63
Humphrey Taylor & Robert Leitman, No Significant Change in the Number of “Cyberchondriacs”—Those Who Go Online for Health Care Information, HEALTH CARE NEWS,
Apr. 12, 2004, at 1, available at http://harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/
healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2004Vol4_Iss07.pdf. The discrepancy between the
two statistics can likely be explained by the year in which the study was performed.
Every year, more and more people turn to the Internet for information. FOX, supra
note 3, at 1. An even more recent study estimated that between seventy-five percent
and eighty percent of Internet users have looked online for health information. Id.
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This use is particularly pronounced among individuals who are
already receiving healthcare from a physician. One study found that
patients frequently use the Internet to search for specific medical
conditions (sixty-three percent) or a certain medical treatment or
64
procedure (forty-seven percent).
Another study indicated that
eighty percent of all patients go online, and that ninety percent of
these patients have used the Internet to help understand their medi65
cal conditions.
Because patients routinely perform Internet searches to learn
more about their condition or symptoms, it is worth considering what
66
impact the Internet has on their healthcare decisions. In one study,
respondents were asked various questions concerning the impact of
67
the Internet on their interactions with their physicians. The study
found that thirty-six percent of those who frequently use the Internet
sometimes or often suggested a specific illness when visiting a physi68
cian. In contrast, only sixteen percent of patients who hardly ever
69
In addition, forty-five
use the Internet made similar suggestions.
percent of frequent Internet users sometimes or often request a specific treatment, while only nineteen percent of “hardly ever” Internet
70
In other words, Internet users are
users make similar requests.
more likely to actively seek to shape the course of diagnosis and
71
treatment with their physicians.
The same study asked patients how they use information from
physicians when making healthcare decisions. The data showed that
some patients still abdicate complete decision-making authority to
their physicians: eight percent of patients relied entirely on physi-

64

Nath, supra note 60, at 534.
Vinod Podichetty & David Penn, The Progressive Roles of Electronic Medicine: Benefits, Concerns, and Costs, 328 AM. J. MED. SCI. 94, 96 (2004).
66
See The Increasing Impact of eHealth on Consumer Behavior, HEALTH CARE NEWS,
June 26, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Impact of eHealth], available at http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_
iss21.pdf (“As our . . . study revealed, those who use the Internet to explore health issues report that the information they find online has an impact on how they manage
their overall health and comply with prescribed treatments.”).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 2.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether a patient’s accessing
the Internet for medical information leads to better or to worse care. This Article
only addresses—regardless of the source of the patient’s beliefs—whether obligations
are imposed on a physician when a patient demands a specific course of care that is
medically contraindicated.
65
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72

cians for health decisions. In contrast, nine percent used online resources to diagnose themselves and determine the proper treatment,
and then to persuade their physicians to provide the treatment they
73
sought. Most people fell somewhere in the middle: fifty-five percent
relied on physicians to make healthcare decisions but used the Internet to learn more about the physician’s diagnosis, and twenty-eight
percent sought information online to present to and discuss with
their doctor but still relied on the physician to make the ultimate de74
cision.
These results demonstrate that over ninety percent of patients
still rely considerably (and some entirely) on their physicians for help
and advice in making proper medical decisions. For most patients,
this is likely to be consistent with a collaborative decision-making
process and, arguably, the help of the Internet is likely to result in
more informed decisions. Of concern, however, are the nine percent
of patients who self-diagnose and who may, with the acquiescence of
the physician, treat the physician as a mere vehicle for obtaining services that they desire but that are medically contraindicated. These
individuals may demand medically inappropriate services and give
physicians ultimatums to provide requested care or lose their business. The problem, as noted by one physician, is that the demanded
care is not necessarily the proper care: “[Y]ou know the old lawyer’s
[saying] about a person who represents himself has a fool for a cli75
ent? That applies in medicine, too.”
IV. DTCA AND ITS IMPACT ON PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS
The marketing of medical products to consumers has a lengthy
history. Prior to the enactment of the Food and Drug Act of 1906,
itinerant peddlers and other scam artists were free to advertise their
“snake oil” and other self-proclaimed “miracle” cures directly to the
76
public. In part to counteract these marketing abuses, the federal
77
government established the FDA in 1906. The FDA was authorized
to screen proposed medications for safety and efficacy and to review
72

Impact of eHealth, supra note 66, at 4.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or
Trap for the Unwary?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 89, 151–52 (1998).
76
See, e.g., Zachary T. Bloomgarden, American Diabetes Association Annual Meeting
1999: Diabetes and Obesity, 23 DIABETES CARE 118, 123 (2000) (explaining that the use
of “sanitized tapeworms” was widely advertised as an easy weight loss program in the
early 1900s).
77
See Food and Drug Act of 1906, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–26 (2006).
73
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the marketing of medical products to ensure that the American public was not deceived into purchasing untested or dangerous medica78
tions. The development of, potential profit from, and competition
among medical products has increased dramatically in recent years,
however, which in turn has driven a desire to market medical products much more extensively. This desire led to calls from the promoters of these products to allow direct advertising once more to the
79
American public.
A. The FDA’s Relaxed Standards
The FDA has permitted direct-to-consumer advertising since the
early 1980s, yet until recently companies seldom utilized DTCA due
to the costs and burdens of complying with FDA disclosure require80
ments.
The FDA, among other things, required pharmaceutical
companies to explain in considerable depth the risks associated with
81
their products.
This condition was based on the FDA’s assertion
that it was vital for prospective patients to know the risks to which
they were exposing themselves—which was entirely consistent with
82
the notions of informed consent that dominated this era.
The FDA’s requirements were greatly relaxed in 1997 with the
83
release of a Draft Guidance by the FDA. The FDA’s Draft Guidance
78

21 C.F.R. § 202 (2006); see Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing
Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97, 100 (2002) (“[T]he FDA oversees the labeling and the advertising
of prescription drugs. The FDA also regulates the labeling of all medical devices and
the advertising of ‘restricted’ medical devices.”).
79
Most developed countries, however, have withstood these calls. New Zealand
and the United States have been reported to be the only developed nations allowing
DTCA. Milt Freudenheim, Showdown Looms in Congress over Drug Advertising, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at C1.
80
See Jaclyn Carole Hill, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond: Exploring Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising Liability in the New Millennium, 72 DEF. COUNS. J.
362, 362 (2005).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Yonni D. Fushman, Case Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs, Inc.: Toward Creating
a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 1161, 1173–74 (2000); see also Sheryl Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where it Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
2241, 2270 (2004). The FDA and Congress are currently considering reversing the
1997 relaxation of the regulation of DTCA and “[i]n the face of this pressure, the
pharmaceutical industry has voluntarily agreed to abstain from advertising a new
drug within the first six months of its release.” W. David Bradford et al., The Impact of
DCA on the Use and Effectiveness of Statin Drugs, Presentation at the Conference of the
American Society of Health Economists (June 5, 2006), http://healtheconomics.us/
conference/2006/abstracts/issues-in-the-promotion-and-advertising-of-medicines/the
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marked a fundamental shift in the FDA’s policy on advertisements for
prescription drugs and dramatically changed the restrictions on
DTCA. These guidelines noted the “inability of broadcast advertisements of reasonable length to present and communicate effectively
the extensive [disclosure] information” previously deemed necessary
by the FDA to prevent patients from being inappropriately swayed by
84
As a result, currently a pharmaceutical company
this marketing.
“merely has to identify the major side effects and ‘contraindications
85
[of a medical product] in lay language during the broadcast.’” Instead of forcing companies to find a way to fully disclose the risks associated with their product, the FDA permits these advertisements to
gloss over these risks by, for example, hiring an actor to speak very
86
fast to convey a difficult to comprehend warning.
As will be discussed, despite assertions from manufacturers that the information
from these advertisements will improve medical decision making, arguably the opposite has resulted.
B. Prevalence of DTCA
The effect of the FDA’s relaxed standards was an absolute flood
of DTCA. In 1996, the year before the FDA issued its Draft Guidance,
87
pharmaceutical companies spent $595.5 million on DTCA. By 1999,
following the FDA’s 1997 issuance of its Draft Guidance, DTCA
_impact_of_dca_on_the_use_and_effectiveness_of_statin_drugs (last visited Mar. 20,
2009).
84
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. Aug. 12, 1997) (notice of draft guidance for industry).
85
Calabro, supra note 83, at 2270–71. Specifically, in 1997 broadcast advertisements were required to contain “(1) a toll-free number that provides more specific
information about a drug; (2) an alternative means of dispensing package labeling
for consumers not connected to the internet; (3) a statement directing consumers to
pharmacists and / or physicians; and (4) an internet web page address with specific
information about the drug.” Fushman, supra note 83, at 1174. The final version of
the FDA’s draft guidance was issued in 1999, adding the requirement that broadcast
advertisements “be accompanied by more extensive print ads.” Id.
86
Lawmakers and others have criticized the FDA’s enforcement of DTCA regulations. See Julie M. Donahue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 674 (2007)
(citing Gov’t Accountability Office, Prescription Drugs: Improvements Needed in FDA’s
Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (November 2006)). Since these criticisms,
legislators have considered bills to place greater restrictions on DTCA. See, e.g.,
David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 259 (2008) (analyzing two proposals before Congress that would require disclaimers on DTCA and place a moratorium on the DTCA of certain medications);
Matthew Perrone, Bill Could Block Some Ads for New Drugs, SFGATE.COM, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/04/17/national/w083226D
34.DTL&type (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
87
Fushman, supra note 83, at 1170 n.60.
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88

spending nearly quadrupled to a then-record $1.9 billion. The expanded use of DTCA has continued during the ensuing years.
Spending by pharmaceutical companies on DTCA reached $5.4 bil89
lion in 2006.
Companies are using television commercials, as well as virtually
all other media outlets, to promote everything from antidepressant
90
medications to specific surgical procedures. Medtronic Inc., for example, spent $100 million on an advertising campaign to encourage
consumers/patients to ask their doctors about the possible need for
91
a surgically-implanted $30,000 heart defibrillator.
C. Effects of DTCA
Proponents of DTCA—mostly pharmaceutical companies—
defend these expenditures as an important method to “raise aware88

Id.
Linda A. Johnson, Consumer Drug Ads Down This Year, Report Says,
USATODAY.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/200811-14-4021946389_x.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Spending is reported to have
declined three percent in 2007 to $5.3 billion, a still sizeable sum, and to have decreased six percent over the first eight months of 2008. Id. This drop has been alternatively attributed to fewer blockbuster drugs coming on the market, overall industry cost-cutting, “heat from lawsuits and critics claiming [drug company] ads
overstate benefits and understate risks of some drugs,” and “the Food and Drug Administration now requir[ing] a few drug companies to get preapproval before airing
ads.” Id. Despite this diminishment, concerns about the adverse impact of DTCA
continue to proliferate. See Dingell, Stupak Send Five Letters Regarding Questionable DTC
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 6(40) HEALTH LAW WKLY. (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/News/Health%20Lawyers%20Weekly/Pages/2008/O
ctober%202008/October%2017%202008/Dingell,StupakSendFiveLettersRegarding
QuestionableDTCAdvertisingOfPrescriptionDrugs.aspx (“Congressman John D.
Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Bart
Stupak (D-MI), Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, sent
five letters October 14[, 2008,] in furtherance of their investigation into direct-toconsumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs.”); Bruce Japsen, Medical Ads Aim
Straight for the Heart, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2007, at C1; Francesca L. Kritz, Promises, Promises: As Efforts to Rein in TV Ads for Drugs Have Stumbled, Experts Worry That Too Many of
Them Go Unchecked, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at F-3.
90
See, e.g., Marshall H. Chin, The Patient’s Role in the Choice of Medications: Direct-toConsumer Advertising and Patient Decision Aids, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 771,
772 n.5 (2005) (noting that DTCA markets drugs directly to consumers through television, newspapers, magazines, direct mail, and the Internet); David M. Fritch, Should
the Purple Pill by Any Other Drug Company Still Be as Purple? The Changing Face of Trade
Dress Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 47 IDEA 171, 188 (2006) (describing
the “marketing blitz” of the drug Prilosec on television, the Internet, and print ads);
Louis Boyarsky, Note, Stealth Celebrity Testimonials of Prescription Drugs: Placing the Consumer in Harm’s Way and How the FDA Has Dropped the Ball, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
101, 102 (2008) (noting pharmaceutical companies’ use of celebrity talk shows to advertise their products).
91
Japsen, supra note 89.
89
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ness” of medical conditions and the availability of related medical
92
treatments. Critics, however, insist that the purpose—and effect—
of DTCA is to sell drugs and other medical products, not to inform
the public. These critics claim the advertisements misinform pa93
tients, not to mention enhance healthcare costs. Even the former
Commissioner of the FDA, David Kessler, who oversaw the implementation of the revised guidelines of the FDA, seems to regret the FDA’s
decision, stating that direct-to-consumer ads “do not effectively or
consistently convey important information about product risks and
94
benefits.”
Regardless of whether DTCA benefits society by increasing
awareness of medical conditions and treatments, or harms society by
misinforming and misleading patients into pursuing unduly expensive and unneeded medical products, an important question to address is whether DTCA is indeed having the effect its producers intend. Specifically, are patients requesting, and in some cases
insisting, on particular medical products and services after viewing
these advertisements, and is the medical judgment of physicians
compromised as a result of the pressure they feel to order them?
Various studies give reason for concern.
A 1998 study found that sixty-three percent of patients requested
95
a specific prescription medication by name. Another study, however, found that only thirty percent of patients knew which drug they
wanted before walking into a doctor’s office, with forty percent of
96
them receiving the requested drug. But even this more conservative
92

Id. One Medtronic executive goes so far as to say, “This is about trying to save
more lives. . . . There are people dying every day because they are not protected and
they do not know they have a problem.” Id.
93
Id.; see Rita Rubin, Analysis: Prescription Drug Ads Leave Out Risks, Alternatives,
USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2007, at D7. Although critics of DTCA have focused on their
promotion of pharmaceuticals, concerns have also been raised about the use of
DTCA to promote medical devices. Barry Meier, Consumer Ads for Medical Devices Subject of Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C12 (“As makers of medical devices
like artificial knees and heart stents increasingly pitch their products directly to consumers, some lawmakers, medical groups, and others are calling for restrictions on
such advertisements, claiming they mislead patients.”); Emily P. Walker, Medical Device Direct-to-Consumer Ads Said to Need More FDA Oversight, MEDPAGE TODAY, Sept. 20,
2008, http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/HealthPolicy/10989 (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009) (“The FDA should expand its oversight of direct-to-consumer
ads to include medical devices, a prominent orthopedic surgeon and cardiologist
told a congressional panel here this week.”).
94
Rubin, supra note 93.
95
Fushman, supra note 83, at 1171.
96
Id. But see Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498, 504 (2002) (referring to an international study that
found that twenty-five percent of patients initiated conversations with their physicians
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finding indicates that twelve percent of patients requested and received specific prescription drugs from their physicians.
Furthermore, as described below, DTCA seems to result in increased prescriptions and pressures for those prescriptions, creates
the potential for unwarranted prescribing of medications notwithstanding the risks they may impose, and appears to augment healthcare costs.
1.

Increase in Prescriptions

Perhaps not surprising in light of the significant investment in
DTCA, studies strongly indicate that DTCA does in fact increase the
97
use of the advertised product. For example, in a nationally representative telephone survey conducted in January 2008 by the Harvard
School of Public Health, Kaiser Family Foundation, and USA Today,
ninety-one percent of the adults contacted said they had heard or
seen DTCA and thirty-two percent said they had discussed the adver98
tised drugs with their physicians. Furthermore, of those who talked
to their doctor about an advertised drug, forty-four percent were
99
given a prescription for that drug.
Similarly, the American Medical Association (AMA) conducted a
randomized trial to determine “the effects of patients’ DTCA-related
100
While portrayrequests on physicians’ initial treatment decisions.”
ing symptoms of either a major depressive disorder or an adjustment
disorder during their appointments with a physician, patients made a
general request (that is, a particular type of medication was requested
but a brand-specific request was not made), a brand-specific request,
101
or did not request medication.
The study found that patients who
requested medication were much more likely to receive a medication
102
Furthermore, fifty-five
than patients who made no such request.
concerning drugs they saw on television, and just under six percent actually received
the prescription).
97
See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 86, at 270 (describing a National Institute for
Health Care Management study that found that the number of prescriptions for the
fifty most advertised drugs rose 24.6% from 1999 to 2000).
98
USA TODAY, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 4 (2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7748.pdf.
99
Id. In addition, these conversations were likely to result in the physician prescribing at least some medication, with eighty-two percent of these patients receiving
the drug they asked about or some other prescription. Id.
100
Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of Patients’ Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 293 JAMA 1995, 1995 (2005).
101
Id. at 1996.
102
Id. at 2000.
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percent of patients who presented with an adjustment disorder and
made a brand-specific request linked to DTCA received this prescription, compared to only ten percent of those who did not make such a
103
In other words, patients in this category were five times
request.
more likely to receive a given medication if they specifically requested
it. With regard to patients who portrayed major depression,
“[a]ntidepressant prescribing rates were highest for visits in which
[patients] made general requests for medication (76%), lowest for
visits in which [patients] made no medication request (31%), and intermediate for visits in which [patients] made brand-specific requests
104
The study concluded that
linked to DTC advertising (53%[)].”
“DTC advertisement-driven requests (along with general requests)
105
dramatically boost prescribing.”
A study on the impact of DTCA on osteoarthritis medications
similarly found that such advertising led to an increase in the pre106
Specifically, the DTCA produced by
scribing of these medications.
pharmaceutical giants Merck and Pfizer significantly increased the
107
number of Vioxx prescriptions.
The researchers found that Vioxx
DTCA also had a significant effect on the number of physician vis108
The study concluded that DTCA increased the rate at which
its.
109
advertised medications were prescribed.
Supporters of DTCA argue that increased levels of prescriptions
resulting from DTCA lead to more informed patients, improved diagnoses, and possibly even increased adherence to doctors’ recom110
Supporters further claim that the ads may lead to
mendations.
heightened awareness of under-treated, under-diagnosed condi111
tions.

103

Id. at 1998.
Id.
105
Id. at 2000.
106
W. David Bradford et al., How Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertising for Osteoarthritis Drugs Affects Physicians’ Prescribing Behavior, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1371, 1376
(2006).
107
Id The study was performed in 2000. Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market
in September 2004 due to evidence of increased risk of heart attacks and stroke associated with its use. Id. at 1372.
108
Id. at 1375. But note that Celebrex advertising had little effect on the number
of Celebrex prescriptions. Id.
109
Id. at 1376.
110
See Rosenthal et al., supra note 96, at 504.
111
Rob Stein, Marketing the Illness and the Cure?: Drug Ads May Sell People on the Idea
That They Are Sick, WASH. POST, May 30, 2006, at A3.
104
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Critics respond, however, that many of the ensuing prescriptions
112
are unnecessary and even dangerous.
Adverse effects from prescription medication in general are the leading cause of iatrogenic injury and death, claiming more victims than car accidents, illegal
113
Given the risks associated with prescription
drugs, or diabetes.
medications and their respective side effects, doctors should, at a
minimum, thoroughly explore and consider the need for and likely
impact of any medication or other form of medical treatment before
complying with the requests of patients for a given treatment re114
gime.
2.

Inappropriate Treatment

One commentator noted that “[t]he potential costs [of DTCA]
are inappropriate prescribing driven by the demands of misinformed
patients and time wasted by physicians in explaining why a particular
115
therapy or product is not appropriate.”
The AMA maintains that
DTCA creates demand based on wants rather than needs, which can
116
lead to “disease-mongering.”
Disease-mongering has been described as “taking [a condition]
that is within normal bounds and labeling it a disease needing phar117
Television, Internet, and print ads for a
maceutical treatment.”
new drug manufactured to treat restless leg syndrome, for example,
have been criticized as creating “disease-mongering” among normal,
118
healthy individuals. Critics of these ads worry that people who simply have a hard time sitting still will request and receive an inappro119
priate prescription medication.
In general, as one medical scholar
explains, “[t]he ordinary experiences of life become a diagnosis,

112

See Devin Taylor, Note, Importing a Headache for Which There’s No Medicine: Why
Drug Reimportation Should and Will Fail, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1421, 1467 (2007).
113
See Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients,
279 JAMA 1200, 1204 (1998). This study published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA) found that adverse drug reactions “may rank from the
fourth to sixth leading cause of death” in the United States, following heart disease,
cancer, and stroke. Id.
114
What distinguishes prescription medications from the over-the-counter drugs is
that they have been established to carry a certain level of risk in addition to the benefit they may provide.
115
See Rosenthal et al., supra note 96, at 504.
116
Japsen, supra note 89. Sick people demanding medication is also a serious concern. They may as a result not be receiving the treatment they need, as well as potentially suffering possible side effects from the treatment they do receive.
117
Stein, supra note 111.
118
Id.
119
Id.
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which makes healthy people feel like they’re sick.” By definition, a
medication that requires a prescription carries with it a risk of delete121
rious side effects. If healthy patients demand and receive prescription medication, they unnecessarily incur the risks and side effects associated with the drugs, as well as simultaneously increasing
healthcare costs for the rest of society.
3.

Increase in Healthcare Costs

Unlike most non-medical products, prescription medications
and other medical treatments are paid for largely by employers, insurance companies, and society. Although out-of-pocket costs have
increased, patients still pay a relatively small percentage of the costs
122
Because patients have few incentives to limit
of their healthcare.
expenditures and society as a whole is largely left holding the bill for
prescribed medications (as well as other medical treatments), the advent of DTCA and the resulting increased number of prescriptions or
other medical treatments administered may inevitably lead to increased healthcare costs for all. Following the FDA’s relaxation of its
restrictions on DTCA, for example, some insurers reported double123
digit increases in prescription costs.
D. DTCA’s Impact on the Physician-Patient Relationship
When paternalism was the controlling principle governing the
physician-patient relationship, patients simply followed the instructions of their doctor. Forty years ago, it was rare for a patient to contact a doctor and demand a certain medication or treatment. In general, patients would not even have known which medication to
request.
With the advent of DTCA, the Internet, and the patient autonomy movement, patients now frequently diagnose themselves and decide upon a needed course of treatment before contacting their physician. As one commentator noted, “Where once patients relied on
doctors to decide which drugs to treat an ailment, now patients have
120

Id.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
122
FACTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 61, at 2 (“nearly 15 percent of employees had no employer-sponsored health coverage available to them, either
through their own job or through a family member”); Higher Costs and Stagnant Incomes, supra note 61, at 2 (reporting that the share of total health spending paid for
out-of-pocket was 33.6% in 2004). These out-of-pocket costs can nevertheless be considerable for a given individual and are generally increasing, but they still remain
only a fraction of the total healthcare bill. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
123
Japsen, supra note 89.
121
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foreknowledge of the drugs they want and go to doctors as one would
124
go to any vendor.”
This patient insistence on a course of treatment can have a significant impact on physicians. One study found that ninety percent
of doctors reported feeling pressured to prescribe certain medications, eighty percent assented to patient requests, and thirty-one per125
cent admitted to prescribing drugs that were not their first choice.
Similarly, it has been reported that “71 percent of family physicians
believe that direct-to-consumer advertising pressures physicians into
126
Such
prescribing drugs that they would not ordinarily prescribe.”
findings have led “[c]ritics [to] despair that direct-to-consumer advertising causes physicians to waste valuable time during encounters with
patients and encourages the use of expensive and sometimes unnec127
These critics assert that “consumer-directed
essary medications.”
advertisements are having their intended effect—consumers are asking their doctors for the advertised products and doctors are re128
sponding positively.”
Increased patient requests for medication due to DTCA and in129
formation available on the Internet can create an atmosphere in
which physicians feel pressured to acquiesce to their patients’ requests rather than employ their own medical judgment. This atmosphere is potentially injurious to patients and physicians alike. Physicians should always provide clinical advice and order treatment that is
130
consistent with their medical judgment, and they should not be allowed to abdicate this responsibility, even in the face of direct pressure from the patient.
The allure of succumbing to patient pressure becomes more apparent when one considers the financial pressures that physicians
face today. Managed care organizations require physicians to hold
131
down costs; immense overhead is associated with, among other
124

Fushman, supra note 83, at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
126
Rosenthal et al., supra note 96, at 498 (citing M.S. Lipsky & C.A. Taylor, The
Opinions and Experiences of Family Physicians Regarding Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 45
J. FAM. PRACT. 495, 495–99 (1997)).
127
Id.
128
Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the
Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 844 (1991).
129
See supra notes 97–109 and accompanying text.
130
Note that the concerns identified in this Article do not arise when a patient
chooses or suggests a viable treatment plan that coincides with the physician’s medical judgment, even if it is not the physician’s first choice.
131
See, e.g., John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the
Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397,
125
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things, maintaining state-of-the-art healthcare facilities and adhering
132
to strict record-keeping requirements; the need for revenue places
greater pressure to sustain and increase “patient flow”—that is, to
process a given number of patients within a given allotted period of
133
time; and the federal government deeply discounts payments for
services provided to Medicare, Medicaid, and other government134
funded patients.
In addition, physicians are subject to financial
pressures from their own expectations and needs, as well as those of
their spouses and children, who often feel entitled to a nice home,
expensive vacations, and a high standard of living after sacrificing for
135
These financial stresses
many years during their medical training.
are only compounded by physicians’ potentially astronomical student
loans, which can be the equivalent of a home mortgage, or other
136
As a result, physicians often feel presforms of accumulated debt.
sure to satisfy and retain patients as if they were customers in a retail
137
business.
Nevertheless, physicians must resist these financial pres1402 (1997) (“Financial penalties and the threat of being terminated from an MCO
network provide strong incentives for physicians to restrict medical care . . . .”).
132
See, e.g., Deborah J. Meyers, Are You Hip with HIPAA? The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Is in Place to Benefit Employees, but Comes with Some High
Costs to Employers, ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/benefits-insurance-health/4882371.html (“One of the downsides of HIPAA is the increased cost . . . .”). See generally
Peggy Peck, Survey Reveals Large Numbers of Practicing Physicians Ready to Call It Quits,
MEDPAGE TODAY, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy
/HealthPolicy/11823 (reporting that “only 17% [of practicing physicians] said their
practices were financially healthy and profitable”).
133
John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care Selective
Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 185 (1996).
134
COMM. ON PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY MED., AMERICAN ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, OVERCROWDING CRISIS IN OUR NATION’S EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: IS OUR SAFETY NET
UNRAVELING?, 114 PEDIATRICS 878, 879 (2004) (“This incredible economic burden
[for physicians and hospitals] is exacerbated by insufficient Medicare reimbursement, which frequently fails to cover the direct costs of either the hospital facility or
the emergency physician.”); Peck, supra note 132 (finding that sixty-six percent of
practicing physicians said “Medicaid doesn’t pay enough to cover the cost of providing care and 36% said the same of Medicare”).
135
See Jacob Goldstein, As Doctors Get a Life, Strains Show: Quest for Free Time Reshapes
Medicine; A Team Approach, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2008, at A1 (“63% of medical residents said the availability of free time was causing them a ‘significant level of concern’ as they entered the profession, up from 15% in 2001.”).
136
Editorial, Repair Student Loan Repayment Now: A Federal Legislative Change in How
Medical School Graduates Repay Their Loans Leaves Residents in a Financial Pinch, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/11
/19/edsa1119.htm (“Medical school graduates carry an average of $130,571 in
debt.”).
137
This analogy to the commercial world and the forces of the “market” is being
compounded by the recent trend to make available to prospective medical care con-
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sures and provide treatment and services that reflect their medical
judgment—even when faced with patients threatening to take their
“business” elsewhere.
Physicians also should not abdicate their all-important responsibility of exercising sound medical judgment just because they are not
fully informed about a patient’s condition and have limited time
available to do related research.
Richard Kravitz explains,
“[P]hysicians don’t know much about [certain illnesses] and may be
wanting to follow the path of least resistance [i.e., acquiesce to the
patient’s request] and prescribe a medication for a condition that a
138
patient might not have.”
Whether physicians are following the “path of least resistance,”
trying to maintain physician-patient relationships for fiscal purposes,
or simply abdicating decision-making responsibility to their patients,
studies indicate that some physicians inappropriately assent to patient
139
Due to DTCA and the Internet, patients often now bedemands.
lieve they are informed regarding the appropriate course of treatment,
so they enter the doctor’s office seeking a specific treatment rather
than medical advice. At times, patients may act as though they have
already received an examination and diagnosis, and all that is needed
140
is the physician’s signature to receive a particular treatment.
Even
when patient autonomy was at its zenith under the doctrine of informed consent, the physician was nonetheless expected to be the
one recommending a course of treatment, with the patient deciding
among proffered options. In the current era of DTCA and the Internet, there is evidence that on some occasions it is the patient that
both recommends the course of treatment and makes the final deci-

sumers comparative rankings of healthcare providers. See, e.g., Top American Hospitals—US News Best Hospitals, http://health.usnews.com/sections/health/besthospitals (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
138
Stein, supra note 111.
139
The studies indicate that most physicians assent to patient demands. See supra
notes 97–109 and accompanying text. Assent itself, however, is not necessarily wrong
or dangerous. Assent is only problematic when the physician fails to exercise his or
her own medical judgment and subsequently provides the patient with medically
contraindicated treatment. This Article contends that only some of these physicians
are violating their fiduciary duty when they provide assent—that is, those who are
abdicating their responsibility to exercise sound medical judgment.
140
See Caroline L. Nadal, Note, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements
in the New Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 504
(2001) (“[P]atients often tell their physicians which prescription medication they
wish to take, sometimes reducing physicians into mere purveyors of prescription
slips.”).
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sion. The doctor has potentially gone from being the sole decisionmaker, to being a joint decision-maker, to being an educated adviser
and consultant, to being at most an inconvenient “speed bump” and
at worst an irrelevant formality.
The emergence of DTCA and the Internet has resulted in a fundamental change in the interactions between physicians and patients
142
with patients playing a much more active role. The following questions must now be answered. What role should physicians play in
these interactions? And what bounds are or should be placed on related physician behavior by medical ethics and governing law?
V. THE DOCTOR’S OBLIGATIONS
A. Informed Consent
The term “informed consent” was coined and explained in Salgo
143
v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, where a California
Court of Appeals declared that “[a] physician violates his duty to his
patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which
are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the pa144
tient to the proposed treatment.” Within the next few decades, obtaining informed consent became an ethical and legal duty imposed
145
on physicians throughout the country.
The core ethics committee
of the American Medial Association (AMA), the Judicial Council (renamed the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs in 1985), announced the AMA’s stance on informed consent in 1982:
The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The patient should make his own determination
on treatment. . . . Social policy does not accept the paternalistic
141

See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 1260 (N.J. 1999) (“[Physicians]
claim pushy patients, prodded by the DTC advertisements, pressed, wheedled,
begged and berated them for quick treatments.”).
142
See, e.g., Calabro, supra note 83, at 2272 (“Direct-to-consumer advertising
[places pressure on physicians] by changing the physician-patient relationship such
that the physician may no longer be in a superior position to warn his patient about
the risks associated with the drug.”).
143
317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
144
Id. at 181.
145
The American Hospital Association included the following statement regarding informed consent in its Patient’s Bill of Rights: “The patient has the right to receive from his physician information necessary to give informed consent prior to the
start of any procedure and / or treatment.” AMERICAN HOSP. ASS’N, PATIENT’S BILL OF
RIGHTS para. 3 (Feb. 6, 1973), reprinted in DIETER GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW appx. IV (1988).
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view that the physician may remain silent because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy. Rational, informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly, even
under similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing treat146
ment.

Informed consent, which started as a legal duty imposed by the
courts, is now viewed as so integral to minimally adequate healthcare
that it has been transformed into an obligation incumbent upon and
147
universally accepted by physicians.
Physicians now have an ethical
and legal responsibility to inform patients of the potential material
risks and benefits of any proposed treatment and any viable alternatives to treatment before obtaining a patient’s consent to perform a
medical procedure, with patients generally given the right to make
the ultimate decisions regarding the commencement and course of
148
Physicians, nevertheless, are not
their treatment for themselves.
absolved from responsibility or liability simply because a patient expresses a certain treatment choice, particularly if the patient’s choice
is inconsistent with the physician’s judgment of what constitutes appropriate medical practice.
B. Informed Consent Alone Is Inadequate in a World of
DTCA/Internet
Pursuant to the requirements of the informed consent doctrine,
physicians generally describe various possible courses of action to
their patients, with patients choosing from among the options provided but often acquiescing in the judgment of their physician re149
garding the best course of treatment.
The emergence of DTCA
and other information “aids” has created the potential for a fundamental shift in this process. Now, after exposure to DTCA or conducting research on the Internet, a patient is much more likely to re146

FADEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 96.
Id. at 101.
148
Id. at 100.
149
Whitney et al., supra note 49, at 54. Critics have argued that informed consent,
as it was designed, rarely occurs because physicians exercise considerable control
over the decision-making process, in part by shaping the information provided the
patient and in part because the patient relies heavily on cues and direction provided
by the physician. They assert that beneficence still dominates the physician-patient
relationship and that doctors continue to make virtually all of the treatment decisions. GEORGE ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET 61, 66 (1998)
(“[A]fter almost three decades of legal and ethical debate, neither the idea nor the
ideal of informed consent governs the doctor-patient relationship. . . . [While] informed consent is well entrenched in theory . . . in practice patient autonomy continues to be elusive.”).
147
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quest or perhaps demand a specific treatment option—including options that the physician did not or would not have raised and that the
physician does not support.
This potential shift in the nature of the interaction between the
physician and the patient necessitates a corresponding recognition
that merely informing patients of their treatment options does not
150
mark the end of physicians’ responsibility to their patients. Even at
its apex—when it afforded the greatest weight to patient autonomy—
the informed consent doctrine only required a physician to provide a
patient with material information regarding the various alternative
treatment options available before the patient “consented” to a given
151
course of treatment. It did not establish that the physician must inevitably acquiesce to whatever course of treatment the patient desires.
As discussed, before the advent of DTCA and the Internet, the
question of who exercises ultimate decision-making authority in a
physician-patient relationship would largely have been irrelevant, as
patients rarely knew enough to independently generate and appraise
treatment options, and physicians would have been unlikely to raise
treatment options that they did not think were viable or were unwilling to perform. Indeed, physicians generally are not required in the
course of obtaining informed consent to raise treatment options that
contain significant risks but lack corresponding benefits. In essence,
because physicians only introduced what they considered to be viable
treatment options, physicians exercised their independent medical
judgment, provided their “implied consent” to the discussed options,
152
and maintained their critical role in medical decision making.
This critical role, however, is not fulfilled when the patient requests and the physician acquiesces in a treatment that the physician
believes is medically contraindicated. As will be discussed, physicians
cannot satisfy their ethical and legal obligation to their patients simply by providing all material information regarding the options discussed. When a physician acquiesces to a patient’s request for treatment that the physician believes is medically contraindicated, the

150

As will be discussed, this Article asserts that this more stringent duty already exists in the form of the physician’s fiduciary duty. See infra Part VI.
151
See Rich, supra note 56, at 102 (outlining the requirements of informed consent).
152
Because of fewer financial pressures, physicians also may have felt freer to reject a course of treatment requested by a patient and, if the patient insisted on this
course of treatment, to terminate the physician-patient relationship.

HAFEMEISTER (FINAL)

364

4/6/2009 10:45:41 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:335

physician has failed to fulfill his or her fiduciary obligation as a
153
healthcare provider.
Before addressing the rationale for and the nature of this fiduciary obligation, it is worth emphasizing that the focus here is the scenario where the physician provides access to requested services that
the physician believes are medically contraindicated. The existing informed consent doctrine adequately addresses situations where a patient proposes a viable medical alternative. For example, if a patient
who suffers from high cholesterol enters a doctor’s office and requests the prescription medication Lipitor after viewing commercials
touting its effectiveness, and it is the physician’s medical judgment
that the patient is a good candidate for the drug—even though the
doctor might prefer that the patient first attempt to lower his or her
cholesterol through diet and exercise—the doctor has satisfied the
requirements of the informed consent doctrine, as well as the physician’s fiduciary obligation to the patient, by explaining the material
risks and benefits of these alternative options and then respecting the
patient’s choice between two medically viable options. That is, the
physician should explain the relative advantages of exercise and
healthy eating as opposed to using this medication, but the physician
is free to acquiesce and order the patient’s requested treatment as
long as (1) the physician has exercised his or her independent medical judgment and believes the drug is reasonably likely to be effective,
and (2) the patient’s medical history or other factors do not make the
ordering of this drug medically contraindicated.
If, however, the treatment being sought is not medically indicated in the physician’s judgment, the doctor has, as will be discussed, an ethical and a legal duty to refuse to comply with the patient’s request. The doctor, not the patient, has the education and
training necessary to determine when treatment is medically contraindicated under such a scenario and, thus, the responsibility to refuse

153

See supra Part V.A. This may give rise to a cause of action based on medical
malpractice or lack of informed consent. These causes of action, however, are illequipped to handle the given situation for a variety of reasons. See Thomas L.
Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Emergent Medical
Risk, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2009) (manuscript at 38–44, on file with
authors); see also Caroline Anne Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 14–16), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112073#. Here, informed consent is
insufficient because the patient herself is seeking the treatment and thus providing
consent, while medical malpractice is insufficient due to its focus on the standard of
care, rather than the standard of conduct. See infra Part VI.C.2.
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to provide access to a treatment simply because it was requested or
154
demanded by a patient.
C. Professional Judgment
The doctor should not be a passive participant in medical decision making and become a mere formality needed to finalize the exchange between a pharmaceutical company and the target of its television advertising or Internet promotions. Physicians are welleducated, well-trained professionals who are and should be responsible for determining whether a requested course of treatment is medically appropriate. Whether they are administering prescription
medications, performing surgical procedures, or providing or facilitating the delivery of other medical services and products, physicians
must be ultimately responsible for treatment. They must appraise
whether a requested treatment is medically indicated for a given patient.
As demonstrated by federal laws that limit access to controlled
155
substances and state licensing requirements that limit who may pre156
scribe medications, society has made a collective decision not to allow the general public to gain unfettered access to many medications
and other forms of medical treatment. For example, an individual
cannot simply walk into a pharmacy and obtain a regulated medication; rather, the patient must give the pharmacist a prescription
signed by a physician. This signed prescription indicates to the
pharmacist that a licensed physician has consulted with the patient,
performed any necessary tests and obtained any needed information,
and determined that the patient should receive the prescribed medication. This prescription process is designed to ensure that a licensed physician has determined that it is safe and appropriate for
someone to take a certain drug. Because physicians are charged by
society with ensuring that medications and other forms of medical
treatment are only made available when medically appropriate, physicians are obligated to exercise their professional judgment when
providing treatment to their patients.
Society’s decision to prevent broad, unfettered access to medications and other forms of medical treatment by the public has received
ample support from the courts. For example, in Reyes v. Wyeth Labora154

Edwin Leap, I’m the Doctor, Not You!, EMERGENCY MED. NEWS, May 2007, at 19.
See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a)–(c) (2006) (describing when and how controlled substances may be dispensed).
156
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.345 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.107
(West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837a (2007).
155
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tories, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that a pharmaceutical company is not liable for injuries caused by the
prescription medications it manufactures and advertises as long as a
“learned intermediary”—a doctor—authorized and implicitly recommended the medication through a prescription. The court explained that
in the case of a prescription drug which is unavoidably unsafe, and as to which there is a certain, though small, risk
throughout the population, there must be either a warning—meaningful and complete so as to be understood by
the recipient—or an individualized medical judgment that this
treatment or medication is necessary and desirable for this
158
patient.
The ruling in Reyes gave birth to the learned intermediary rule, under
which the proposition was endorsed that physicians are the least cost
avoider—that is, doctors are in a better position to prevent adverse
drug effects from contraindicated prescription medication than the
pharmaceutical industry or the patient. The learned intermediary
rule demonstrates that society desires and needs a qualified gatekeeper—the physician—to shoulder the responsibility of ensuring
that various medical treatments, particularly prescription medications, are ordered and consumed only when medically indicated.
Despite society’s recent emphasis on respecting and promoting
patient autonomy, doctors must continue to play a significant role in
ensuring that appropriate decisions are made regarding medical
treatment. Patients may have become “‘consumers’ . . . with . . . [a]
right . . . to be actively involved in decision-making about treat159
ment,” but being involved in and unilaterally making a medical decision are two very different scenarios.
The physician must remain a knowledgeable and trained expert
who exercises independent professional judgment before ordering or
performing an agreed-upon treatment. The physician is not a subservient pawn in the patient’s life, but an erudite and trustworthy
partner dedicated to promoting and protecting a patient’s medical
well-being.

157
158
159

498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1295 (emphasis added).
Mead & Bower, supra note 54, at 1090.
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VI. THE PHYSICIAN’S OBLIGATION TO EXERCISE
160
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
A physician’s failure to exercise independent professional judgment by ordering treatment that is not medically indicated but is demanded by a patient brings into play an often overlooked and arguably underdeveloped doctrine—a physician’s fiduciary obligation to a
161
patient.
This section will address (1) the nature of fiduciary duties
in general; (2) why a physician should be considered a fiduciary in
general and with regard to medically contraindicated demands by a
patient; (3) what is entailed by a cause of action for breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty to exercise independent medical judgment; and
(4) the impact of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
A. Fiduciary Duties: Development and Focus in General
The doctrine of fiduciary duty has “deep roots” in the common
This doctrine was originally developed to help govern the adlaw.
162

160

See generally Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah Payne Bryan, Beware Those Bearing
Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV.
491, 519–28 (2009) (providing general overview and discussion of a physician’s fiduciary duty to a patient); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 153 (manuscript at 24–33)
(providing general overview and discussion of a physician’s fiduciary duty to a patient); Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 331, 337 (2008) (“This concept of the physician as fiduciary has become well
accepted in both U.S. law and the ethical tenets of American professional medical associations.”).
161
See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983) (“Little has been written about the origin of fiduciary law, the rationales behind the creation of fiduciary duties, the remedies for violations of these duties, and the methods
by which courts fashion such remedies.”).
162
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 519–20 (“Originally, fiduciary doctrine
was the courts’ response ‘to the absence of a remedy . . . for beneficiaries injured by
the disloyalty of [their] trustees.’ Over time, this doctrine has been extended beyond
the trustee-beneficiary relationship to other relationships in which a party (the fiduciary) is entrusted with the responsibility to act and make decisions on behalf of another individual (the beneficiary), with the expectation that the fiduciary will seek to
promote the beneficiary’s welfare. Fiduciary relationships have been found to exist
between partners of a company, directors and companies, attorneys and clients,
agents and principals, stockbrokers and clients, and, directly relevant to this discussion, physicians and patients.”) (citations omitted); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note
153 (manuscript at 25) (“Fiduciary duties have deep roots in the common law.
Within the law governing the administration of trusts—where a trustee has been appointed to administer a corpus or an estate on behalf of a beneficiary—courts developed the concept of fiduciary duty. Originally an equitable remedy to correct the
harm done by a disloyal trustee, fiduciary duties now apply to many relationships in
which a party is entrusted with the welfare of someone who is relatively vulnerable.”)
(citations omitted).
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163

ministration of trusts, with the goal of remedying harm caused by a
164
The doctrine was later expanded to include other
disloyal trustee.
165
It now encompasses a range of relationships
agency relationships.
where one party (the fiduciary) is “entrusted with the welfare of
someone [i.e., the beneficiary] who is relatively vulnerable,” including transactions between attorneys and clients, guardians and wards,
financial advisors and clients, and corporate officers and sharehold166
ers.
Currently, a fiduciary duty is generally construed to be “[a] duty
of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary; a duty to act with the highest degree of
honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of
167
Additionally, a fiduciary must “promote the inthe other person.”
terests of [the] beneficiar[y] rather than [the fiduciary’s] own inter168
ests.”
As noted, fiduciary obligations have been imposed on various
169
professionals, and generally stem from (1) the beneficiary’s vulnerability and dependence on the fiduciary, (2) the superior knowledge
and related skills of the fiduciary, and (3) the trust placed in the fi170
duciary to protect and promote the best interests of the beneficiary.
163

Andrew Grubb, The Doctor as Fiduciary, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 311, 311
(1994).
164
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 519; Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note
153 (manuscript at 25).
165
E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: Discarding a Misguided
Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 588–89 (2005); Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160,
at 519–20; Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 153 (manuscript at 25).
166
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 519–20; Hafemeister & Spinos, supra
note 153 (manuscript at 25); Morreim, supra note 165, at 588–89.
167
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
168
Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 365, 393 (2005).
169
See supra note 166 and accompanying text. See also Frankel, supra note 161, at
795 (“Fiduciaries appear in a variety of forms, including agents, partners, directors
and officers, trustees, executors and administrators, receivers, bailees, and guardians.”); Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 519–20; Hafemeister & Spinos, supra
note 153 (manuscript at 25).
170
Frankel, supra note 161, at 796; Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 520
(“Fiduciary rules are designed to ensure that the fiduciary fulfills his or her obligations and does not neglect, abuse, exploit, or otherwise take advantage of the relatively vulnerable and dependent beneficiary.”); id. at 524 (Fiduciary duties exist “because of the dependence and vulnerability of the beneficiary and the level of trust
imbued in the fiduciary.”); id. at 526 (“The fiduciary duty doctrine was applied to
trustees to control three aspects of the typical trustee-beneficiary relationship: the
disparity of knowledge between the trustee and the beneficiary, the trustee’s ability
to act relatively unilaterally, and the vulnerability and dependence of the beneficiary
on the trustee.”).
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B. Physicians as Fiduciaries
1.

Physicians’ Fiduciary Obligation to Their Patients

In 1956, a California Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he doc171
tor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one.”
Many courts over the
years have determined that physicians owe a fiduciary obligation to
172
their patients, stemming from the intrinsic nature of the physicianpatient relationship.
The physician-patient relationship embodies all three bases routinely cited as the rationale for concluding that a fiduciary duty exists
between two parties. As the following discussion demonstrates, physi171

Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (“[I]t is incumbent on the doctor to reveal all pertinent information to his patient.”). The recognition of a fiduciary relationship between physicians and patients can be further traced
back to at least 1931 when the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically noted that a fiduciary relationship exists between physicians and patients. Schmucking v. Mayo,
235 N.W. 633, 633 (Minn. 1931). In support of this proposition, the court cited Groendal—a ruling from 1912 by the Michigan Supreme Court. Groendal v. Westrate,
137 N.W. 87, 96 (Mich. 1912) (“[T]he relation of physician and patient, which, of itself, begets confidence and reliance on the part of the patient.”).
172
See, e.g., Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 n.7 (10th Cir. 1979) (“The duty of
the doctor to inform the patient is in the nature of a fiduciary duty.”); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[W]e ourselves have found in the ‘fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship the physician’s duty to reveal to
the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he should know.’”) (citations omitted); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding that the doctrine of informed consent is based partially on the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237
F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (“It is axiomatic that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one.”); Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984) (“Alabama recognizes [a] cause[] of action for breach of fiduciary duty . . . resulting from
a physician's unauthorized disclosure of information acquired during the physicianpatient relationship.”); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972) (“Any defense . . .
must be consistent with . . . the ‘fiducial’ qualities of the physician-patient relationship.”) (citation omitted); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 804 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969) (“The relationship between a physician and his patient is fiduciary, which, like
all such relationships, imposes a duty of full disclosure.”); Wohlgemuth, 293 P.2d at
820 (“The doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one . . . .”); Petrillo v. Syntex
Laboratories, 499 N.E.2d 952, 960–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“The fiducial nature of
the physician-patient relationship flows not from the physician’s ethical duties, but
rather as a result of the physician’s unique role in society. Like the confidentiality of
the physician-patient relationship, we believe that our society has an established and
beneficial interest in the fiduciary quality of the physician-patient relationship.”);
Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 (Me. 1980) (“The historical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent are frequently attributed to the fiduciary character of the physician-patient relationship.”); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d
907, 908 (Tex. 1983) (“[T]he physician-patient relationship is one of trust and confidence . . . .”); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (noting the “fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship”). See also Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 527; Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 153 (manuscript at 26).
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cians owe their patients a fiduciary obligation due to (1) the vulnerability of patients and their dependence on physicians for their medical care, (2) the considerable and superior knowledge and related
skills of physicians, and (3) the trust that patients and society imbue
173
in physicians to protect and promote their patients’ best interests.
a.

Vulnerability and Dependence on the Physician

The features of a physician-patient relationship closely resemble
174
those of the typical fiduciary relationship.
For example, physicians
control access to and the use of important resources that patients
175
need.
Just as a trustee controls those funds and other assets desig176
nated to help the specified beneficiary of an established trust, the
physician controls a patient’s ability to obtain needed resources to
which the patient is otherwise entitled—namely, medical services,
such as diagnostic tests and treatment, prescriptions for medications,
admission to a hospital on a non-emergency basis, and referrals to a
177
specialist, as well as third party payments for healthcare costs.
Just
as a trustee must protect the resources dedicated to the welfare of the
beneficiary, a physician must promote and protect the health of patients, who have entrusted physicians with their safety and well178
Simply put, patients cannot access medical services pivotal
being.
to their health and survival without the aid of a physician. This dependence is enhanced by the fact that patients tend to contact physicians when they are ill or suffering and in great need of the services
179
This vulnerability
to which only the physician can provide access.
173

Marc. A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 245–46 (1995).
174
Id. at 245.
175
Id.
176
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (1959) (“[A] trust involves three
elements, namely, (1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another; (2) a beneficiary, to whom the
trustee owes equitable duties to deal with the trust property for his benefit; (3) trust
property, which is held by the trustee for the beneficiary.”).
177
Id.
178
See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 389 n.76 (1990) (“Since providers often act for patients in situations wherein patients are unable to act for themselves, the fiduciary obligation might be said to arise in part because of the patient’s
delegation of control, similar to the control delegated . . . by a beneficiary to a trustee.”).
179
Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 153 (manuscript at 26) (“Because patients
generally seek the services of a physician when they are sick, injured, or concerned
about their health, because doctors have unique access to a patient’s medical information and superior insight into a patient’s medical condition, and because physi-
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and dependence creates a significant need for the physician’s supe180
rior knowledge and related specialized skills.
b.

Information and Skill Disparity

In addition, the physician-patient relationship “must be subject
to fiduciary requirements because of the information disparity be181
tween the parties.”
While it is true that laypersons today have
greater access to medical information than ever before (through the
Internet, television, books, magazines, and so forth), such resources
cannot compete with four years of medical school, completion of a
residency, internships and fellowships, and years of firsthand experience. In addition, physicians are required to obtain and maintain a
license to practice medicine, which includes meeting educational requirements, passing standardized exams, and satisfying continuing
182
education requirements.
This knowledge discrepancy between physicians and patients is
only exacerbated—not alleviated—by the misinformation and misunderstanding that may result from DTCA and from unfettered ac183
cess to Internet-based medical information.
The essential point is
that the medical knowledge of a patient who has spent time on
WebMD.com, or who has viewed an emotionally evocative commercial does not remotely compare to that of a well-educated physician.
While patients focused on their own symptoms and conditions can
perform useful related research, gain relevant insights, and convey
germane information to their physician, patients are rarely equipped
to independently understand or apply this information, nor do they
have the diagnostic and treatment skills needed to adequately and
appropriately respond to this information. Patients’ relative lack of
medical knowledge and skills, as well as their vulnerability and decians control patients’ ability to obtain needed medical treatment, patients are highly
dependent on their physicians and should be able to rely on their physicians to protect and promote their well-being.” (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
731 (1997) (noting that “trust . . . is essential to the doctor-patient relationship”))).
Patients generally do have the option of contacting a different physician to gain access to needed services, but pursuing this option, with its delay and potential additional cost or disruption of an existing physician-patient relationship or delivery of
services, can be highly burdensome for a patient—particularly if the patient is currently sick or injured.
180
Id.
181
Mehlman, supra note 178, at 366 n.6; see also Rodwin, supra note 173, at 245
(explaining that physicians are similar to other fiduciaries because they “have specialized knowledge and expertise”).
182
See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 62–63 (2000).
183
See supra Parts III & IV.
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pendence on physicians, necessitate a relationship with their physician that is imbued with loyalty and trust. This expectation of trust
forms the foundation of the physician’s fiduciary obligations to a pa184
tient.
c.

Patients’ Trust in Their Physicians
185

In Cobbs v. Grant, the California Supreme Court recognized
that “the patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject
dependence upon and trust in his [or her] physician for the information upon which [the patient] relies during the decisional process,
thus raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms186
length transactions.”
Practically speaking, few professional relationships, if any, require more trust than a patient’s relationship with
a physician. Patients, for example, rely on their physicians’ advice in
determining whether to undergo an invasive procedure or ingest potent medications that may have significant risks, including possible
adverse side effects. In making these decisions, patients—and society
in general—must be able to trust physicians, rely on their loyalty, and
rest assured that physicians will place the patient’s best interests
187
above all other potentially competing interests.
As in California, an Illinois Court of Appeals similarly determined that patients place a “special confidence” in their physicians
when they seek medical assistance and that physicians, in turn, owe
their patients a duty of “good faith” consistent with their fiduciary ob188
The court contended that “[t]he patient should . . . be
ligations.
able to trust [that] the physician will act in the [patient’s] best interests[,] thereby protecting the sanctity of the physician-patient rela189
tionship.”
The AMA itself has recognized that the physician-patient relationship is “based on trust” and thus physicians have an obligation to
190
Due to the
“place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest.”
184

Rodwin, supra note 173, at 245–46 (“The patient-physician relationship presupposes patients entrusting physicians to act on their behalf and physicians remaining loyal to their patients.”); see also infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
185
502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
186
Id. at 9.
187
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 530 (“[T]he purpose behind recognizing a breach of fiduciary duty claim in this context is to deter disloyal conduct on the
part of the physician.”).
188
Taber v. Riordan, 403 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
189
Id.
190
AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 10.015: THE PATIENTPHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP (2001) [hereinafter AMA PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP],
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level of trust that patients must be able to place in their physician, patients’ vulnerability to and dependence on physicians, and the disparity in information and skills that exists between patients and physicians, physicians have a fiduciary obligation to protect the best
191
interests of their patients.
2.

A Physician’s Fiduciary Obligation to Refuse to Provide
Treatment That Is Not Medically Indicated

The AMA has stated that “[p]hysicians are not ethically obliged
to deliver care that, in their best professional judgment, will not have
a reasonable chance of benefiting their patients[,] [and p]atients
192
should not be given treatments simply because they demand them.”
Because the AMA generally recognizes that physicians have an ethical
193
duty to exercise independent medical judgment, the question becomes whether a doctor’s fiduciary obligation legally requires the doctor to “just say no” to a demanding patient.
As indicated previously, a fiduciary is required to promote the
194
interests of the beneficiary rather than the fiduciary’s own interests.

available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/Code_of_Med_Eth/
opinion/opinion10015.html.
191
See Taber, 403 N.E.2d at 1353 (“There can be little dispute that a doctor occupies a condition of trust and confidence, a fiduciary relationship with his [or her] patient.”) (citation omitted).
192
AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 2.035: FUTILE CARE (1994),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/Code_of_Med_Eth/
opinion/opinion2035.html. This statement by the AMA relates to the delivery of futile care, but it is just as applicable, if not more so, in the case of DTCA. Generally
speaking, futile care involves treatment that is unnecessary or wasteful, but not harmful. In contrast, DTCA may involve treatment that is not only unnecessary or wasteful, but also potentially harmful—or at least may involve drugs or procedures that involve unnecessary risks.
193
See AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (“As a member of this profession,
a physician must recognize responsibility to patients first and foremost . . . . A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care . . . . A physician shall,
while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”); AM.
MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.03: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
GUIDELINES (1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/
Code_of_Med_Eth/opinion/opinion803.html (“Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of their patients. . . . If a
conflict develops between the physician’s financial interest and the physician’s responsibilities to the patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patient’s benefit.”);
William J. Plested III, President, Am. Med. Ass’n, A Declaration of Independence
(June 23, 2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/17781.
html (“The time has come for the Physicians of America . . . to issue our own Declaration of the Independence, the independence of our profession.”).
194
Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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As fiduciaries, physicians must “hold[] the best interests of the patient . . . paramount,” even when they may face adverse financial con195
sequences as a result. As described in the scenario at the beginning
of this Article, physicians may, for example, have a financial interest
in keeping their patients happy—that is, they may find it in their selfinterest to give their “consumers” what they want in the way of medical services to ensure that they will receive their patients’ future busi196
ness. Because of patients’ limited ability to make medical decisions
for themselves, however, physicians—to properly serve the best interests of their patients—must always exercise their independent medical judgment and provide access only to appropriate medical services.
Thus, to satisfy their fiduciary obligation, physicians should authorize access only to those services that reflect and represent the exercise of their independent medical judgment and that are medically
indicated for the patient—that is, provide access consistent with the
patient’s medical needs and condition. To ensure that physicians retain their valued and valuable role in the physician-patient relationship, physicians must always exercise their independent medical
judgment, even when doing so is contrary to the expressed wishes of
the patient and may jeopardize the physician’s financial well-being or
other self-interests. If physicians fail to exercise their medical judgment, they violate their fiduciary obligation to the patient and should
be subject to potential legal liability.
C. What Is Entailed by a Cause of Action for Breach of a Physician’s
Fiduciary Duty to Exercise Independent Medical Judgment
Physicians who do not exercise independent medical judgment
in the face of a specific request from a patient for treatment that is
medically contraindicated fail to meet their fiduciary obligation to
that patient. Physicians who fail to meet this obligation may be subject to a cause of action for breach of their fiduciary obligation.

195

AMA PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP, supra note 190.
As interest increases in making “consumer” ratings publically available, the satisfaction of a physician’s patients with the services provided may shape the willingness of other prospective patients to utilize the physician’s services. See generally Reed
Abelson, National Standards to Rank Physicians Planned, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2008, at
C3; Could CMS Start ‘Physician Profiling’ in the Near Future? CONTEMP. OB/GYN, Aug. 1,
2007.
196
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Elements of a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
197

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty generally sounds in tort.
As a result, to successfully pursue such a claim, generally four elements must be shown: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) damages (harm) incurred by the person to
whom that duty was owed, and (4) a causal link between the breach
198
and the resulting harm.
As established earlier, physicians owe their patients a fiduciary
199
obligation in general.
To satisfy the first element of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff has to show that a physician-patient relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of the alleged misconduct, that the physician was
acting within the scope of that relationship, and that the fiduciary
duty in question is inherent in physician-patient relationships. Also,
200
the physician as a fiduciary is obligated, among other things, to exercise his or her independent medical judgment during the course of
the physician-patient relationship, notwithstanding that the patient
197

It can be argued that a breach of fiduciary duty claim should sound in contract
rather than in tort, or should reflect a combination of the two doctrinal foundations.
For example, it can be contended that a breach of fiduciary duty claim constitutes a
contractual violation because a fiduciary breach is a violation of the expectations of
the two parties. In addition, it might be noted that, historically, the fiduciary duty—
with its focus on trustees and the designated beneficiaries of a trust—was based in
trust law, a third possible foundation for a cause of action focused on a breach of a
physician’s fiduciary obligations. An exploration of the strengths, weaknesses, and
appropriateness of each of these alternative doctrinal approaches is beyond the
scope of this Article. Because the approach predominantly used currently is a tort
claim, this Article will employ that approach in conjunction with the analysis provided here. For a brief discussion of these alternative doctrinal foundations, see
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 519 n.168).
198
1615 PLI CORP. LAW & PRACTICE HANDBOOK 521, 548 (2007); see also Gracey v.
Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002) (“The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are: the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that
it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.”). But see Hafemeister & Bryan,
supra note 160, at 524 (“[M]any states do not have either a causation requirement or
an actual harm requirement associated with their fiduciary causes of action. This is
in part because (1) the breach of loyalty is the harm and (2) the purpose behind
recognizing breach of fiduciary duty claims is to remove the incentive for disloyal
conduct on the part of the fiduciary by confiscating the profits gained by fiduciaries
as a result of their conduct, not necessarily to restore beneficiaries to their position
ex ante by compensating their losses.”) (citations omitted).
199
See supra Part VI.B.1.
200
For example, a physician may have a fiduciary duty to keep medical records
and information received in the course of the physician-patient relationship confidential and private, to not engage in a sexual relationship with a current patient, to
avoid conflicts of interests that may compromise medical judgment, and to disclose
to a patient adverse medical conditions of which the patient is unaware. See Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 527.
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has made a specific request for, and in some cases demanded, a particular medical service.
As for the second element, physicians breach their fiduciary duty
to patients when they abdicate their responsibility to exercise independent medical judgment and provide their patients with access to
201
A breach of this
medical services that are not medically indicated.
duty occurs even though the patient has requested or demanded
these services and the physician has disclosed to the patient the risks
associated with these services. A physician cannot abdicate this responsibility and permit the patient to assume the risk associated with
a medical service that the physician, exercising independent medical
202
A patient who
judgment, believes is not medically indicated.
strongly desires such a medical service is of course free to seek this
service from some other physician who may conclude that it is medi203
But a physician who has failed to exercise indecally indicated.
pendent medical judgment in response to a request or demand from
a patient for a specific medical service has breached the physician’s
fiduciary obligation to that patient.
The damages element in tort law generally requires that the
204
plaintiff suffered actual harm as a result of the breach of duty.
201

See supra Part VI.B.2.
Under this standard, because a placebo by definition is not expected to pose a
risk to a patient, it could be argued that a physician who, unbeknownst to the patient, substitutes a placebo for a requested but medically contraindicated prescription could thereby avoid a potential cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. The
use of placebos in medical practice is not uncommon. See Laura Blue, Is Your Doctor
Prescribing Placebos? TIME, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1700079,00.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (reporting that forty-five percent
of responding physicians “said they had prescribed placebos in [their] regular clinical practice and . . . just over half had prescribed a placebo in the previous year.
Among the reasons the doctors gave: to calm a patient down, to respond to demands
for medication that the doctor felt was unnecessary, or simply to do something after
all other treatment options had failed.” (citing Rachel Sherman & John Hickner,
Academic Physicians Use Placebos in Clinical Practice and Believe in the Mind–Body Connection, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 7 (2008))). However, prescribing a placebo without
the patient’s knowledge may represent a breach of the physician’s duty to obtain informed consent before administering treatment. Id.
203
This physician, if independent medical judgment was exercised, would not be
subject to a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty. However, if the physician
provided access to a medical service that was medically contraindicated, the physician
may be subject to a cause of action for medical malpractice if damages to the patient
result from this access. See 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 182, at 264 (“Malpractice is
usually defined as unskillful practice resulting in injury to the patient, a failure to exercise the ‘required degree of care, skill and diligence’ under the circumstances.”).
204
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 405 (2000) (“[D]amages are not presumed
[in a claim based upon negligence] as they are in the case of some intentional torts;
the plaintiff who is not harmed by negligence cannot even recover nominal damages.
202
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However, unless specifically required within a given jurisdiction, the
law governing causes of action for a breach of a fiduciary relationship
may not require a plaintiff to show that the patient experienced ac205
This variation “is in part because (1) the breach of loytual harm.
alty is the harm and (2) the purpose behind recognizing breach of
fiduciary duty claims is to remove the incentive for disloyal conduct
on the part of the fiduciary[,] . . . not necessarily to restore benefici206
The
aries to their position ex ante by compensating their losses.”
absence of actual harm may greatly diminish the award that is avail207
able, but a physician’s failure to exercise independent medical
judgment could result in an award of nominal compensatory damages, with the possibility of an additional award of attorney’s fees or
208
punitive damages. Although a breach of this fiduciary duty may not
result in any physical harm to the patient, an award of damages may
be appropriate in some cases to deter this type of breach.
To prove causation, a possible fourth element of this cause of action, the patient may have to show that “but for” the physician’s
209
Within the
breach the resultant harm would not have occurred.
context of this Article, the question could become whether the harm
to the patient would have occurred even if the physician had said
“no” to the patient’s request or demand for a particular medical service. If a physician can demonstrate that the harm would have occurred anyway (for example, that the patient would have had a myocardial event even if he had not taken the medication), the physician
More significantly, the statement means that the plaintiff must prove not merely that
she suffered harm sometime after the defendant’s negligent act occurred but that
the harm was caused in fact by the defendant’s conduct.”).
205
Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 524.
206
Id.
207
There can, of course, be actual harm associated with a physician providing a
patient with access to a contraindicated medical service (such as medication). For
example, building upon the hypothetical that opened this Article, it should be noted
that the FDA has posted on its web site the results of studies that indicate that there is
a small but measurable risk of a heart attack in individuals with high blood pressure
who ingest certain drugs widely prescribed to increase sexual performance. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Patient Information: CIALIS (See-AL-iss) (tadalafil) Tablets (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/2007/Oct_PI/
Cialis_PPI.pdf. Ordering contraindicated medical services can also expose a physician to a medical malpractice claim. See infra Part VI.C.2.
208
See Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 160, at 524–25.
209
1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 182, at 302 (“Tests [in medical malpractice claims]
for causal connections between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s negligence
are usually described by the courts in terms of the ‘but for’ test. ‘But for’ the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered injury. The plaintiff must present testimony that the defendant’s acts or omissions probably caused the plaintiff’s
injuries.”).
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210

might not be found liable.
However, for the same reasons, as discussed above, that a showing of actual harm may not be required, in
some jurisdictions a causation requirement may not be mandated for
211
a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
2.

A Fiduciary Duty as Opposed to a Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action

While the elements of a fiduciary duty claim can be very similar
to the elements of the more frequently pursued medical malpractice
claim (duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages), they are dis212
tinct causes of action.
The fundamental difference between a medical malpractice
claim and a fiduciary duty claim is that the former reflects an asserted
breach of the physician’s duty of care, while the latter focuses on a
213
Negligence
purported breach of the physician’s duty of conduct.
doctrine, the foundation for a medical malpractice claim, seeks to
enhance the quality of healthcare and to make physicians more prudent in their delivery of medical services by holding them liable for a
failure to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence of a competent physician under similar circumstances (i.e., to do what is cus214
In contrast, the
tomary within the profession in a given context).
recognition of a fiduciary duty indicates that certain conduct is unacceptable even if the fiduciary can identify other fiduciaries who acted
in a similar manner or articulate other possible justifications for the
behavior. Fiduciary doctrine does not seek to make physicians more

210

One of the drawbacks to relying on a tort approach, as seen here, is that it allows the physician to avoid legal liability despite violating a fundamental expectation
associated with the privilege of being a physician, namely, that a physician will exercise independent medical judgment before authorizing medical services. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is arguable that a lawsuit for breach of a fiduciary duty should be a quasi-contractual action rather than a tort action to avoid
impediments resulting from a required showing of actual harm resulting from the
breach (that is, damages and causation).
211
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
212
The similarities are such that at least one commentator has argued that the
“breach of fiduciary duty” claim should be eliminated altogether when its functions
are served by a professional malpractice claim. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary
Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 690–92 (2006).
213
Id. at 691 (“[W]hile negligence is based on a claim of breach of a standard of
care, fiduciary breach is properly based on a claim of breach of a standard of conduct . . . .”).
214
See 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 182, at 264.
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215

“careful,” but rather seeks to establish what is minimally necessary
behavior and, conversely, what behavior will not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances. Fiduciary doctrine establishes that there
are some actions by a physician (as with any fiduciary) that are by
consensus (within and outside the profession) so expected or repugnant that excuses (that is, legal defenses) for failing to act in the expected manner should not be available.
Thus, when a patient has demanded medically contraindicated
care, even though a medical malpractice claim may be untenable due
to the defenses of assumption of risk or contributory or comparative
216
negligence, such defenses should not be available as a response to a
breach of fiduciary duty claim if the physician failed to exercise independent medical judgment in responding to this demand. A fiduciary cause of action does not focus on “fault” (as in where due care
was not exercised); rather, it addresses behaviors in which no physician should engage. There are simply some things that a fiduciary
cannot do. When the fiduciary crosses that line, regardless of the explanation given for that behavior or whether harm directly resulted
from it (the sine qua non of a negligence cause of action), consequences should flow, and a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
217
duty should be available.
Another important difference between the two causes of action
218
is the nature of the proof necessary for the plaintiff to prevail.
Because medical malpractice involves a failure to exercise due care (that
is, the level of care customarily expected of members of that profession under the circumstances), expert testimony is required to demonstrate what the standard of care is and that a physician failed to
219
An action for breach of fiduciary duty, howmeet that standard.
ever, does not require the patient to demonstrate that the physician
failed to exercise due care. Instead, the plaintiff need only show that
the physician’s conduct violated basic rules of conduct regarding how

215

See, e.g., Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort, and
Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 249 (1994)
(“[Fiduciary] duties may be violated without any showing of negligence.”).
216
See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151–53 (N.J. 1988); see also 1
FURROW ET AL., supra note 182, at 294–97.
217
Anderson & Steele, supra note 215, at 249.
218
Id. at 254.
219
Id.
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all physicians are expected to act, for which expert testimony may not
220
be required.
D. The Impact of a Fiduciary Cause of Action Requiring Physicians to
Exercise Independent Medical Judgment
Expressly recognizing that physicians have an obligation to exercise independent medical judgment when a patient asks them to authorize access to services that are not medically indicated does not
necessitate a change in existing substantive law. Instead, it merely requires an embracement and explication of the doctrine that physicians owe a fiduciary duty to their patients. The effect of recognizing
a cause of action for failing to “just say no” to a patient should be to
provide clearer guidance to medical practitioners and to encourage
them to fulfill their responsibility to reject requests from patients for
221
services that are not medically indicated.
Because of recent developments in the doctrine of informed
consent, some physicians may believe that as long as the patient has
been informed of the potential risk of the requested service and reasonable alternatives, physicians have an obligation to permit patients
to choose whatever course of medical services they desire. The physician’s fiduciary duty, however, does not permit the physician to abdicate his or her obligation to exercise independent medical judgment
on behalf of a patient. When the service requested by the patient is
not medically indicated, the physician must refuse to authorize access
to that service.
VII. THE BENEFITS OF RECOGNIZING THAT PHYSICIANS
HAVE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO EXERCISE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL
JUDGMENT IN RESPONSE TO A PATIENT’S DEMAND FOR A SERVICE
THAT IS NOT MEDICALLY INDICATED
Recognizing that doctors have a fiduciary duty to resist a patient’s demand for a service that is not medically indicated will be
beneficial to the doctor, the patient, and society as a whole.

220

Id. (“[B]ecause an action based on breach of fiduciary duty raises the issue
only of whether the [fiduciary]’s conduct violated rules governing the profession, an
expert’s testimony is not required to show violation of those rules.”).
221
Recognizing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in this instance can
also empower physicians to speak when a contentious request for “futile” care is
made. See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL FUTILITY IN END-OF-LIFE CARE: REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, in 281 JAMA 937, 940 (1999) (arguing for a “fair process approach” to resolve questions regarding futile medical care).
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A. Benefits to Physicians
Although it may seem counter-intuitive on its face, physicians
will enjoy a distinct benefit as the result of recognizing physicians’ fiduciary duty to refuse to comply with a patient’s request for a service
that is not medically indicated. It will empower members of the profession to fully exercise their training and skills and will minimize financial incentives that might otherwise lead them to diminish and
perhaps even abdicate their role in medical decision making.
Charging physicians with a responsibility to refuse requested
treatment that is inconsistent with their medical judgment inherently
gives them the right to refuse patient demands for medically contraindicated treatment. Just as a patient has a general right to refuse
treatment that a physician recommends, physicians have a general
right to refuse to provide treatment on which a patient inappropri222
As a result, both can be active participants in medical
ately insists.
decision making—the doctor can reject a patient’s proposal if it does
not represent “good” medicine, and the patient can reject a doctor’s
proposal if it does not match what the patient believes is needed under the circumstances. This is likely to enhance the quality of and
satisfaction with the medical care provided, while protecting and
promoting the autonomy of both the patients and the physicians involved in these decisions. In sum, imposing liability on physicians for
a failure to “say no” to a patient’s request or demand for treatment
that is not medically indicated duly empowers physicians to decline to
223
provide access to such treatment.
222

See Rahul K. Parikh, Showing the Patient the Door, Permanently, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2008, at F6 (asserting that the physician-patient compact “gives a doctor the right
to dismiss a patient”). It should be noted that this Article does not advocate that
physicians return to an inherently dominant role in their relationships with patients. Such a relationship is not therapeutic or “good” medicine. This Article
strongly support a collaborative relationship between physicians and patients where
both have vital roles to play.
223
It should be emphasized that this power to “say no” to a patient’s request or
demand for treatment only recognizes treatment refusals that are not medically indicated (that is, those that do not reflect the medical interests of the patient). It does
not embrace refusals that are based on the physician’s personal preference, convenience, or financial advantage. Requiring a patient to seek services from an alternative healthcare provider can entail considerable inconvenience and risk for the patient. A patient may not be able to find a healthcare provider readily available. For
example, there may be a limited pool of healthcare providers willing to provide services to Medicare or Medicaid patients because of the deep discounts in payments for
services afforded these patients. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. An alternative healthcare provider may be located farther away or at a location that is difficult for the patient to access, which can cause considerable hardship for an ailing
patient. The patient must introduce the alternative healthcare provider to the nature of his or her medical problem and provide relevant medical history, which may
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During this era of DTCA and Internet access to medical information, physicians may be concerned that they will lose patients critical to the physicians’ financial well-being if they refuse to provide requested medication or access to other medical services. Their
concern may be justifiable. One survey found that seventy-five percent of polled patients said they would switch doctors to get the
224
medicine they wanted.
With a clear legal obligation to refuse requests that are not medically indicated, physicians will be less likely to
fear that they will experience financial disadvantage if they fail to acquiesce to such patient requests. Because every physician will now
have a responsibility to refuse these requests, all physicians will be in
the same financial position, and patients will not be able to “shop
around” for a physician who is willing to disregard his or her fiduciary
responsibility.
B. Benefits to Patients
A primary benefit to patients from recognizing a physician’s fiduciary duty to exercise independent medical judgment is that a
check will be placed on imprudent, sometimes impulsive, and perhaps even dangerous requests by patients. Importantly, this check
will be provided by an independent professional with the expertise
and skill needed to appropriately review the request. As discussed,
patients, as lay persons with access to a growing, albeit frequently incomplete or even misleading body of information that they may not
225
adequately understand, are often not equipped to identify all of the
risks and benefits of a possible course of medical action. If their physicians abdicate their responsibility to independently review and determine access to medical services, patients may be harmed by their
requests or incur other losses needlessly, such as delayed access to
more appropriate services or expenditures on costly but ineffective
services. Although the input of the patient should be encouraged
and the patient’s choice regarding the course of treatment re226
spected, the patient’s interests will ultimately be promoted best if
the physician is also an active participant in the medical decision
making.
delay the delivery of needed services. Medical records must be transferred and vital
information conveyed in the past that was not entered into those records may be lost.
Medical “handoffs” in general tend to increase the risk of harm to patients. See
ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH BEHIND
AMERICA’S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES 159–79 (2005).
224
Fushman, supra note 83, at 1172.
225
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
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In addition, providing a cause of action to a patient whose physician has breached the fiduciary duty to exercise independent medical
judgment will supply such patients with a legal remedy that can award
compensation for this breach. It might be argued that a physician’s
failure to exercise independent medical judgment when providing
access to services that are not medically indicated would be better
addressed by approaching this as a breach of the physician’s ethical
227
obligations.
A physician’s violation of an ethical duty may result in
reprimand by a board of licensure, suspension of the physician’s license to practice medicine, or even revocation of the right to practice
228
However, these sanctions do not provide a remedy to
medicine.
the patient. The patient will not be able to initiate or be directly involved in related proceedings to ascertain whether the physician has
breached his or her ethical obligation, and thus the patient will not
receive the satisfaction that may result from being an active participant in these proceedings. Also, the patient will only be compensated for any harm incurred as the result of a breach of the physician’s fiduciary duty if the duty owed the patient is part of a
recognized legal cause of action, as boards of licensure focus exclusively on whether a reported wrongdoer should be sanctioned and do
not provide an award of damages to individuals who have been
229
harmed by the unethical actions of the licensed professional.
It might be argued that empowering physicians to reject patient
requests for a desired course of treatment harms patients by diminishing their right to direct the course of their treatment. However,
the patient’s autonomy generally will not be compromised as a result.
First, the physician cannot impose his or her preferred course of
treatment on the patient but can only refuse to provide access to the
services requested. Second, a physician’s fiduciary obligation does
not encompass a right to refuse requested services capriciously;
227

See generally Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 972–75 (2004).
228
See generally 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 182, at 75–76 (discussing physician licensure and disciplinary actions and their respective goals). It is also worth noting
that there is an ongoing debate over whether these sanctions are issued sufficiently
frequently to deter inappropriate behavior by physicians. Cf. Darren Grant & Kelly
C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician Discipline by State Medical
Boards, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 867 (2007) (evaluating data on sanction frequency and repeat offenders). There is little, if any, indication that such sanctions
have been imposed on physicians for failing to exercise independent medical judgment in the face of a patient’s request for services that are not medically indicated.
229
Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 683 (1973) (“The
board [of licensure] has no power to order compensation to an injured party; in effect its power is limited to revocation of the license or lesser variants thereof.”).
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treatment refusals are required only when the physician is seeking to
protect and promote the patient’s best interests. Third, if the patient
disagrees with the physician’s refusal to order a requested medical
service, the patient remains free to attempt to find a physician who
believes the request is medically indicated.
In general, as long as the requested course of treatment is medically indicated, the physician’s fiduciary obligation does not encourage a physician to reject the patient’s treatment request. If a patient
has a medically viable request, the recognition of this cause of action
should not make it any more difficult for a patient to find a doctor
who will honor the request. The only time the patient will not receive requested access to services is when the request is not medically
indicated. Overall, patients are protected from harm but continue to
be able to exercise adequate control over the medical decision making germane to their well-being.
Critics of this fiduciary cause of action may assert a “clean hands”
argument, claiming that it is inappropriate to permit a patient to
benefit from a lawsuit for actions by a physician when it was the patient who “compelled” the physician to breach his or her fiduciary obligation. The law, however, requires that a physician be a gatekeeper
230
for medical treatments, including prescription medications. It does
not matter how hard someone knocks on the gate; the gatekeeper
must only allow those through the gate who medically should enter.
Simply put, a greater obligation is imposed on a highly educated,
trained, and skilled licensed professional than on an uninformed patient. Physicians should not be able to avoid liability for their actions
simply because a patient “insisted” on a certain treatment. By analogy, an automobile driver cannot defend a lawsuit against a passenger
by stating that the passenger encouraged him to drive recklessly. As a
matter of law, the physician is and should be responsible for his or
her medical decisions.

230

Every state has enacted laws that authorize licensed physicians to prescribe
medications and generally exclude other individuals from doing so. James L.J.
Nuzzo, Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Practice Nurses: A Threat to the Public
Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 41 (1998) (“[P]hysicians . . . have enjoyed a pharmaceutical prescription monopoly in fact since the early part of the century and in
law since the [federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] was passed in 1938 . . . .”). Further enhancing physicians’ gate-keeping function, the Controlled Substances Act of
1970 provides an exhaustive list of drugs that are available only by prescription. Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
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C. Benefits to Society
Society has an interest in the protection of the health and well231
being of its members.
As discussed, in the case of potentially dangerous prescription medications, for example, gatekeepers are neces232
sary to ensure the safety of those seeking these drugs.
Approximately 200,000 Americans die each year from adverse reactions to
233
Furthermore, 2.2 million injuries occur
prescription medications.
234
annually as a result of adverse drug events.
In fact, adverse drug
reactions are responsible for an astounding five percent of all hospi235
Society has a strong interest in protal visits in the United States.
tecting its members from and minimizing the occurrence of these adverse events. Because of their risk, medications and other medical
services should only be prescribed when medically indicated. Furthermore, in light of continuing concerns regarding the escalating
236
costs of healthcare, providing physicians with a legal incentive to
refrain from providing patients with access to services that are not
medically indicated may help to control these costs.
Physicians are in a better position to protect individuals from potentially harmful medications that are not medically indicated than
the individuals themselves. Physicians have the expertise and training to accurately diagnose the patient’s condition and to understand
the relative risks and benefits of the courses of treatment being considered. Placing a legal duty on physicians to utilize their knowledge
to protect the health and safety of their patients provides a benefit to
all of society.
In the scenario addressed by this Article, there is an inevitable
tension present. Society must weigh the potential diminishment of
the autonomy of the patient (that is, the patient’s right to exercise
complete control over the medical decision making relevant to that
patient’s body) against the need to ensure appropriate medical deci231

See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 509, 509 (2004).
232
See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the role of
the FDA in ensuring the safety of prescribed medications, see Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U.
L. REV. 449, 449 (2000).
233
Calabro, supra note 83, at 2241.
234
The Center for Drug Safety, Facts of the Day, http://www.centerfordrugsafety.
org/Home_AllFacts.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
235
Id.
236
NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 1 (2008),
http://www.nchc.org/documents/Cost%20Fact%20Sheet-2009.pdf (last visited Mar.
21, 2009).
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sion making (that is, to discourage physicians from abdicating their
valuable role in this decision making). Patients can and should properly determine factors such as how valuable a given treatment is to
them in light of surrounding circumstances, how a proposed treatment plan will disrupt or enhance their life, and the magnitude and
relative weight of the benefits and risks involved. Giving physicians a
legal obligation to resist patient demands for services that are not
medically indicated does not and should not diminish the role of the
patient in medical decision making. It only mandates that physicians
not abdicate their obligation to ensure that the treatment provided is
medically indicated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a world saturated with medical information through DTCA
and the Internet, physicians must know how to respond to “informed” patients. Physicians often face the difficult decision of
whether to provide a requested treatment that is not medically indicated or risk losing a revenue-generating patient. Physicians, however, should not lose sight of their overriding fiduciary obligation to
promote and protect the best interests of their patients, and they
should not permit any potential conflicting interest to overcome this
responsibility, including the possible adverse financial consequences
to their practice that may result from their refusing a patient’s request for a given service. By including within the ambit of the physician’s fiduciary duty a legal obligation to “say no” to a patient requesting services that are not medically indicated, the law empowers
physicians to exercise their medical judgment, an empowerment that
best serves us all.

